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General summary 
The overarching goal in the present project was to investigate memory processes in 
trauma-exposed individuals. In three studies, processes of remembering and forgetting were 
examined in trauma-exposed individuals who had experienced sexual abuse and non trauma-
exposed controls. 
Trauma-exposed individuals experience some degree of repetitive thoughts and 
intrusive memories. Deficits in intentional forgetting and retrieval-induced forgetting, both 
thought to be underpinned by inhibition mechanisms, have been proposed to be a cause of 
intrusive memories in the aftermath of trauma. The studies reported in paper I and II 
employed a variant of Retrieval Induced Forgetting task (RIF) and the Directed Forgetting 
task (DF) to investigate the relationship between trauma and forgetting mechanisms. By 
including trauma-specific cue words, in addition to neutral, positive and threat-related cue 
words, it was possible to test for trauma-specific effects.   
The results reported in paper I showed no differences in RIF between trauma-exposed 
participants and controls. However, we found a general tendency for eradicated RIF for 
emotional material. The finding that RIF does not work for emotional material might have 
different consequences for non trauma-exposed individuals as opposed to trauma-exposed 
individuals. For non trauma-exposed healthy individuals this tendency might be relatively 
harmless and perhaps be reflected in rumination over previous negative or positive 
experiences. In the aftermath of trauma, however, the very same tendency might have a more 
negative impact, because memories that repeatedly intrude into consciousness are experienced 
as very disturbing. 
Uncomfortable intrusive memories from a traumatic experience might lead trauma 
victims to avoid such memories through intentional forgetting. Paradoxically, attempting to 
intentionally forget can have the effect that unwanted thoughts rebound with even greater 
persistence (Wegner, 1989). The findings in paper II showed that there was no difference 
between trauma-exposed and non trauma-exposed participants in correct recall of to-be-
forgotten words of any valence, suggesting that the trauma-exposed participants were neither 
better nor worse than their non trauma-exposed peers in intentional forgetting.  
In sum, the findings in paper I and II did not support a hypothesis of impaired 
inhibition mechanisms in trauma-exposed individuals. However, the results reported in paper 
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II did show that trauma-exposed individuals had a higher level of “Intrusive“ recall of to-be-
forgotten trauma words when asked to recall to-be-remembered words. Moreover, this 
tendency was related to symptoms of intrusion reported on the IES. This might suggest 
problems in source monitoring of trauma-related material in trauma-exposed individuals.  
Paper III investigated the relationship between trauma exposure and specificity and 
temporal distribution of autobiographical memories and future directed thoughts. A 
relationship between trauma symptoms and reduced specificity of autobiographical memories 
was found, but no such relationship was found for future-directed thoughts. The results 
reported in paper III suggest that trauma symptoms only influence the specificity of mental 
time travel to the past, and not to the future. No difference in temporal distribution of future 
directed thoughts or autobiographical memories between trauma-exposed participants and 
controls was found. 
In summary, this thesis contributes to the understanding of processes of remembering 
and forgetting in trauma-exposed individuals.  
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Introduction 
Trauma and post-traumatic stress 
The word ‘trauma’ comes from Greek and means ‘wound’, and was first used in the 
beginning of the 20th century to describe mental reactions to a traumatic event (Brewin, 2003). 
Arousal and involuntary memories about the traumatic event and avoidance have been central 
in descriptions of human reactions to traumatic events in the literature (Van der Kolk, 2007). 
In Shakespeare’s play Macbeth, classical post-trauma symptoms such as emotional 
overwhelming, nightmares, and disturbing recollections are described. Another example can 
be found in Samuel Pepys’ diary where he described post-trauma reactions such as insomnia, 
recurrent dreams and nightmares about the traumatic event, and anxiety reactions after ‘the 
great fire of London’ in 1666 (Daly, 1983). 
The understanding of trauma reactions and psychopathology in the aftermath of 
trauma has changed throughout history. During the World War I, traumatic stress reactions 
observed in soldiers were mainly explained as having physical origins (Van der Kolk, 
Weisaeth & Van der Hart, 2007). However, after it was evident that several of the soldiers 
suffering from trauma symptoms had never been exposed to gunfire, the concept ‘shell shock’ 
was introduced in the literature by Charles Myers (1915), and trauma was recognised to have 
emotional origins. When World War II broke out concepts such as ‘war-neurosis’ and ‘post-
trauma syndrome’ were being used by mental health professionals. Kardiner (1941) described 
‘post-trauma syndrome’ as characterised by intrusive recollection, hyper-vigilance, and 
irritability.  
Parallel to the search for an understanding of trauma reactions in soldiers, scholars like 
Charcot, Janet, Brewer and Freud questioned the etiology of trauma in civilians. Trauma was 
seen in relation to hysteria, and the process of integration of trauma in memory was central in 
both Janet and Freud’s work on trauma (Van der Kolk, 2007).  Breuer and Freud (1893/1955) 
explained that the symptoms of hysteria were caused by memories of psychological traumas. 
Furthermore, they described how some individuals were tormented by unacceptable memories 
related to a psychological trauma in the past. These trauma memories were painful for the 
individual, and according to Breuer and Freud (1893/1955) defense mechanisms such as 
repression were used to force these memories out of consciousness. 
After the Vietnam War, in 1980, Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was included 
as a diagnosis in DSM-III. Three groups of symptoms were defined in DSM-III; re-
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experiencing symptoms, numbing symptoms, and miscellaneous symptoms including hyper-
arousal symptoms, avoidance symptoms and memory and concentration impairments.  The 
PTSD diagnosis defined a causal factor for the disorder as exposure to a “stressor that would 
evoke significant symptoms of distress in almost everyone” and was “outside the range of 
normal human experience” (APA, 1980, p.238). Thus the PTSD diagnosis was formulated to 
include individuals exposed to a broad variety of traumatic events. The PTSD diagnosis was 
heavily influenced by the work of Horowitz (1975; 1976) who proposed that trauma survivors 
go through alternating phases of intrusion and avoidance.  
 In the current DSM, DSM-IV, PTSD is classified as an anxiety disorder, and the 
symptoms include avoidance of reminders of the traumatic experience, avoidance of thinking 
about the trauma, intrusive recall of trauma-related memories, and persistent symptoms of 
arousal (First & Tasman, 2004). Criterion A, the definition of a traumatic event, was changed 
in DSM-IV to include both objective criteria for what constitutes a traumatic events and the 
subjective experience of the event. DSM-IV Criterion A, define a traumatic event as “an 
event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the 
physical integrity of self or others”, furthermore the criterion A (stressor) in DSM-IV also 
include immediate subjective reactions associated with the episode “the person’s response 
involved intense fear, helplessness or horror”. Furthermore, the DSM-III symptom “every 
day memory impairments” was replaced by “inability to recall an important aspect of the 
trauma” in DSM-III-R and this formulation was kept in DSM-IV. 
Critics of the PTSD diagnosis have argued that the symptoms listed in DSM-IV should 
be understood as normal reactions to an abnormal event. According to Field (1999) post-
trauma symptoms such as intrusive memories are normal reactions that disappear with time. 
However, as pointed out by Brewin (2003), even though normal reactions to traumatic events 
are similar to symptoms listed in DSM-IV, PTSD can be recognised by the persistence, and 
intensity of the symptoms and also by the fact that the symptoms do not fade with time. In 
line with this, DSM-IV (criterion E & F) specifies that the “duration of the disturbance is 
more than one month” and that “the disturbance cause clinically significant distress or 
impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning”. Without taking a 
stand in the ongoing discussion about the PTSD diagnosis, it can be argued that trauma 
symptoms are best understood along a continuum as opposed to as a PTSD or non-PTSD 
dichotomy.  
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Understanding the relationship between trauma exposure and post-trauma symptoms, 
and the mechanisms underlying psychopathology in the aftermath of trauma is important, 
because the risk for experiencing a traumatic event sometime during life is high. A study in 
the U.S population reported the estimate of lifetime risk to be 82.8%; however surveys from 
Germany and Switzerland have reported estimates of 20-28% (Breslau, 2009). A proportion 
of people that experience trauma develop persistent PTSD, a review of studies from United 
States, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Lebanon, and Australia reported a 
<10% life-time prevalence of PTSD (Breslau, 2009). 
 
Trauma and Memory 
That experiencing traumatic events influence memory is well established (McNally, 
2003). Trauma can influence memory in a number of ways, but one particularly useful 
distinction is between how trauma influences memory in general and memory for the 
traumatic event in itself. One of the greatest controversies in modern psychology has 
concerned memory of the traumatic event. The fierce exchanges that took place in the 90s, 
often referred to as “the memory wars”, concerned how trauma is remembered (McNally, 
2003). On the one hand there were clinical observations that showed that memories of trauma 
can be suppressed and even totally forgotten and then recovered years later (Brewin, 2003). 
On the other hand some researchers argued that traumatic events are rather highly memorable 
and more difficult to forget than other memories (e.g. Shobe & Kihlstrom, 1997; McNally, 
2005). 
Experiencing trauma does not only influence how we remember the traumatic episode, 
but also memory in general and memory for material that is related to the traumatic event in 
the past. Trauma has for example been reported to be associated with intrusive recall of 
trauma-related memories (Krans, Näring, Becker & Holmes, 2009), retrieval advantage for 
trauma-relevant material (e.g. Golier, Yehuda, Lupien, & Harvey, 2003; Vrana, Roodman, & 
Beckham, 1995), deficits in intentional forgetting (Cottencin et al., 2006), higher level of false 
recall (e.g. Brennen, Dybdahl, & Kapidžić, 2007; Zoellner, Foa, & Przeworski, 2000), and 
overgeneral retrieval of autobiographical memories (for a review see Moore & Zoellner, 
2007).  
Furthermore, disturbance in memory is highlighted in the DSM-IV diagnosis for 
PTSD, and in cognitive theories on PTSD (e.g. Brewin, Dalgleish, Joseph 1996; Ehlers & 
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Clark, 2000; Horowitz, 1975; Rubin et al., 2008). In a recent review, Brewin (2011) 
summarised the empirical literature on the relationship between PTSD and memory 
disturbance. He classified memory into three main aspects and concluded that PTSD is 
associated with alterations in capacity, content and process. Disturbance in memory capacity 
refers to alterations in capability to retain, retrieve and manipulate material, alterations in 
content refers to changes in what semantic and episodic memories individuals remember from 
their past, and finally disturbance of memory process are connected to encoding, storage and 
retrieval. In his review Brewin (2011) concluded disturbances have been reported in all three 
of these aspects of memory. The focus of the present thesis is the relationship between trauma 
exposure and PTSD symptoms and deficits in memory processes. 
Cognitive theories of PTSD.The symptoms of PTSD can be understood from a 
cognitive perspective, and several models of cognitive functioning in PTSD have been 
proposed (e.g. Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa, Steketee & 
Rothbaum, 1989; Horowitz, 1975; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Rubin, Berntsen & Bohni, 2008). 
The three theories highlighted here do not only inform us about cognition in clinical PTSD, 
but can also explain memory processes after trauma exposure and development of persistent 
trauma symptoms in the aftermath of trauma. 
One of the most complete models is Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) cognitive model. This 
model rests upon an assumption that persistent PTSD develops only if trauma is processed in 
such a way that it produces a sense of current threat. First, individuals who suffer from 
persistent PTSD are unable to see trauma as a time-limited event, and rather sees it as global 
and stable in that it is thought to have negative effects for the future. This first key process 
concerns appraisal of the traumatic event, trauma sequelae and appraisal of emotional 
responses. The second key process concerns a disturbance of autobiographical memory, 
which is particularly evident in the symptoms of unwanted intrusive thoughts and at the same 
time difficulties with deliberate retrieval of trauma-related memories. Ehlers & Clark (2000) 
explain these disturbances in memory by poor elaboration and contextualization of trauma 
material and at the same time strong associative memory and perceptual priming. Ehlers & 
Clark’s (2000) model implies that the observed cognitive differences between PTSD patients, 
trauma survivors without PTSD, and people who have never experienced severe trauma, will 
be evident during processing of trauma-related material. 
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Brewin et al.’s (1996) dual representation theory of PTSD holds that two memory 
systems operate in trauma-exposed individuals; verbally accessible memories (VAM) and 
situationally accessible memories (SAM). VAM memories are narratives of an event that can 
be expressed by words, these memories are integrated with autobiographical memory, and can 
be voluntary accessed and edited. SAM memories include information of a more sensory 
quality, these memories can only be accessed involuntarily, and are triggered by the 
situational context. Normally SAM memories are an integrated part of VAM memories. 
However, when experiencing a traumatic episode integration of SAMs into VAM can be 
prevented. As a result more memories of the trauma are integrated into SAM, and the lack of 
integration with VAMs can lead to intrusive memories because inhibition of unwanted 
memories depends on the VAM system. Furthermore, activation of SAM memories is thought 
to explain flashbacks. Normally, in the aftermath of a traumatic event flashbacks would work 
to transfer information from the SAM to the VAM system, however in PTSD there is a 
breakdown in this function possible due to avoidance mechanisms or to great difference 
between information in the VAM and the SAM system (Brewin, 2001). Thus, according to the 
dual process theory two distinct types of memories co-exist in the trauma-exposed individual 
and this can explain the symptoms in PTSD.  
Rubin, Berntsen and Bohni (2008) proposed a memory-based model of PTSD where 
development of PTSD symptoms following a trauma depends on the interaction between the 
event and the memory processes following the event. According to the mnemonic model it is 
the memory of the traumatic event, not the event itself that determines reactions and 
symptoms. As memory is constructive, the memory of the traumatic event is changing and is 
retrieved in different form or versions.  Furthermore, memory is influenced by an individual’s 
current goals as well as number of individual differences such as intelligence, education, 
gender and personality (Rubin et al., 2008). The main argument in Rubin et al.’s (2008) model 
is that memory is a mediator in the relationship between trauma exposure and trauma 
symptoms. Rubin et al.’s (2008) model departs from the DSM-IV model in that DSM-IV does 
not take into consideration that the memory of the trauma changes over time. 
One of the main differences between these theories is the explanation of memory 
processes in the aftermath of trauma. Brewin et al.’s (1996) theory, and Ehlers and Clark’s 
(2000) theory suggest that special memory mechanisms are involved in processing memory of 
a traumatic event, and that these special memory mechanism can explain how post-trauma 
symptoms arise and develop.  According to Brewin et al.’s (1996) theory, and Ehlers and 
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Clark’s (2000) theory, intrusive memories of the traumatic event arise because these 
memories are not integrated with the rest of autobiographical memory. Integration in 
autobiographical memory is prevented by maladaptive strategies like avoidance and 
suppression of disturbing thoughts. According to Rubin et al.’s (2008) model, however, no 
special memory mechanisms are needed to explain post-trauma symptoms like intrusive 
memories. Rather ordinary mechanisms of memory can explain how symptoms of PTSD 
develop after trauma. The mnemonic model is based on a basic mechanisms view, and holds 
that what is known about emotion and memory in general can explain symptoms of PTSD 
(Berntsen, Rubin & Bohni, 2008). Furthermore, this model predicts that also memories for 
emotional events that fall outside the criterion A in DSM-IV can lead to PTSD symptoms. 
Brewin et al.’s (1996) and Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) theories predict that in trauma-
exposed individuals with high levels of trauma symptoms, voluntary memory for the 
traumatic episode is impaired while involuntary recollection is enhanced. Rubin et al.’s 
(2008) theory has an arguably broader scope and is less specified than Brewin et al.’s (1996) 
and Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) theories, and holds that normal memory functioning operates 
after trauma and in people with PTSD. Based on what is known about emotion and memory in 
general, Berntsen et al. (2008) argue that both voluntary and involuntary recall will be 
enhanced for trauma-related memories. 
Brewin et al.’s (1996) and Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) theories suggest that disturbances 
in memory are specifically related to the traumatic episode or material related to the traumatic 
episode.  Also, DSM-IV describe alterations in memory that are connected to the trauma, but 
do not specify whether memory for emotional positive or neutral material is altered. However, 
whether memory deficits after trauma are best characterised a trauma-specific or general 
deficits are yet to be determined. Hence, a pertinent question concerns whether memory 
impairments in trauma-exposed individuals, and in individuals with PTSD in particular, 
extend beyond processing of the traumatic episode or material specifically connected to the 
traumatic episode. 
With background in the three different theoretical perspectives on trauma and memory 
presented above, this thesis aims to further investigate the relationship between trauma 
exposure, trauma symptoms and memory processes. More specifically, the studies in the 
present thesis investigated both voluntary and involuntary memory of material specifically 
related to the traumatic episode in the past, and neutral, positive and negative material. Two 
of the papers in the present thesis approach this question by studying retrieval induced and 
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intentional forgetting of material specifically connected to the traumatic episode as well as 
positive, negative and neutral material. The third paper in the present thesis addresses a 
related question of how retrieval of positive, negative and neutral autobiographical memories 
and future directed thoughts are influenced by trauma exposure and post-trauma symptoms. 
 
Empirical background for the present studies 
Retrieval-induced forgetting after trauma. The repetitive thoughts and intrusive 
memories that trauma-exposed people experience might be explained by deficits in inhibition 
mechanisms. The Retrieval-Induced Forgetting task (RIF) is used to study how repeated 
retrieval practice of some memories can impair retrieval of related memories (Anderson, 
Bjork & Bjork, 1994). In the RIF paradigm participants are asked to learn lists of 
categorically organised words. Subsequently, some words from some of the categories are 
practised in a word-stem completion task. Finally, the participants are asked to recall the 
words from the initial study-list. The words that are practised are best remembered. However, 
the more interesting point is that unpractised words from categories that were practiced are 
worse recalled than unpractised words from categories that were not included in the practice 
phase. So, retrieval practice of “banana” and “apple” makes it more difficult to remember 
“pear” or “orange”, but doesn’t influence how difficult it is to remember “chair” or “table”.  
The RIF effect is proposed to involve inhibitory cognitive control processes during retrieval 
practise, whose function are to facilitate retrieval of a target memory by inhibiting or 
suppressing competing related memories (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Anderson, 2003). 
A line of research has proved solid evidence in support for an inhibitory mechanism account 
for RIF (for an overview see Anderson, 2003). However, the inhibition account for RIF has 
been questioned, and interference has been proposed as an alternative mechanism underlying 
the RIF effect (e.g. Camp, Pecher, & Schmidt, 2007). According to an interference account 
for RIF, forgetting can be explained by reduced effectiveness of the retrieval cue. More 
specifically, rehearsing some items might cause a stronger association with the category cue 
word, and at the same time the association between the category cue words and the 
unpractised item becomes weaker. A problem with an interference explanation for RIF, 
however, is that it cannot account for RIF in memory tests free from interference, such as RIF 
observed in recognition tasks (e.g. Dehli & Brennen, 2009; Hicks & Starns, 2004; Perfect, 
Moulin, Conway, & Perry, 2002; Potts, Law, Golding , & Groome, In Press; Veling & van 
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Knippenberg, 2004), or RIF in studies using independent cues (e.g. Anderson & Spellman, 
1995; Aslan, Baüml, & Pastotter, 2007; Saunders & MacLeod, 2006).   
The tendency for repetitive thoughts and intrusive memories in the aftermath of 
trauma makes it interesting to investigate RIF in trauma-exposed individuals. On the one 
hand, trauma exposure is associated with problems in inhibiting intrusive memories, hence if 
RIF reflects an automatic inhibition mechanism as Anderson (2003) proposes, RIF might be 
predicted to be impaired for trauma-exposed individuals. On the other hand, if RIF is intact 
after trauma this might explain another disturbance of memory that has been reported after 
trauma exposure, that is reduced specificity of autobiographical memories (e.g. McNally, 
Lasko, Macklin & Pitman, 1995): If RIF is still functional, this constant rehearsal of some 
autobiographical memories may make it more difficult to recall the latter ones in a specific 
manner.  
Only one study has previously studied RIF in trauma-exposed individuals. Amir, 
Badour and Freese (2009) investigated whether hypothesised inhibition deficits in PTSD are 
general or specifically related to processing of emotional material. RIF for threat-relevant, 
positive and neutral material was studied in participants with PTSD, trauma-exposed controls 
and non trauma-exposed controls. While the non trauma-exposed controls demonstrated a RIF 
effect for both non-threatening and threatening cues, the PTSD group and the trauma-exposed 
controls showed no RIF effect for any type of cue word. Amir et al. (2009) concluded that 
these results suggest that trauma exposure is associated with a general deficit in inhibition 
mechanisms, and not a specific deficit in processing of trauma-relevant material.  
Intrusive memories are also characteristic for depression (e.g. Brewin, Hunter, Carroll 
& Tata, 1996), and intrusive memories in depression and PTSD have been found to share the 
same characteristics (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). Hence, RIF studies with depressed 
individuals might inform us about intentional forgetting after trauma exposure. A few studies 
have investigated RIF in depressed participants, in one study with clinically depressed 
participants, weaker RIF was found for neutral material (Groome and Sterkaj, 2010). 
Furthermore, induced negative mood has been found to reduce RIF for neutral material in 
healthy participants (Baüml & Kuhbander, 2007). However, a study with high and low 
dysphoric participants showed that it was no difference in RIF between the two groups. 
Furthermore both groups showed RIF for neutral material but no RIF for emotional negative 
material (Moulds & Kandris, 2006). 
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In summary, impaired inhibition mechanisms have been put forward as a candidate for 
explaining intrusive thoughts and memories in PTSD and also in depression. Amir et al.’s 
(2009) study suggests that trauma exposure, independent of PTSD status, is associated with 
impaired RIF for both threat-related and non threat-related cue words.  However, as the 
authors themselves point out, the threatening material used in the study was general, and did 
not refer to a particular type of traumatic episode. Moreover, because the participants had 
experienced different types of traumatic events, for example natural disaster, sexual assault or 
life threatening illness, the threat material might not have been relevant to the kind of trauma 
each participant had experienced. So even if the results suggest that individuals with PTSD 
are susceptible to general inhibition deficits, this study cannot determine whether this 
tendency might be even more pronounced for trauma-specific material. 
Intentional forgetting after trauma. The coexisting symptoms of avoidance and 
intrusion in trauma-exposed individuals can be explained by stronger rebound of trauma 
memories when attempting to suppress, forget or avoid thinking about the traumatic event. 
According to Brewin et al.’ s (1996) and Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) theories, intrusive 
memories of the traumatic event occur because these memories are prevented from being 
integrated into autobiographical memory by maladaptive strategies like avoidance and 
suppression of disturbing thoughts. Brewin et al.’s (1996) and Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) 
theories suggest that this pattern is specific for processing of the traumatic episode or material 
associated with the traumatic episode. In line with this, a study by Shipherd and Beck (2005) 
reported that participants with PTSD had a stronger rebound effect than trauma-exposed 
controls, however this difference was only found for trauma-relevant thoughts and not for 
personally relevant neutral thoughts. 
The Directed Forgetting task (DF) was constructed to measure intentional forgetting 
and has been used to study both avoidant encoding and intrusive recollection in trauma-
exposed individuals. In a DF task, participants are presented with lists of words, followed by 
an instruction either to Remember or to Forget the presented words. There are two main 
versions of the DF task: In the list method DF the Remember or Forget instructions are given 
after presentation of each list, whereas in the item method the Forget or Remember cue is 
given after each word. The standard Directed Forgetting effect refers to the fact that one 
remember more words that one has been instructed to remember (R-words) compared to 
words one was instructed to forget (F-words) (Johnson, 1994). 
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Inhibition mechanisms have been proposed to underlie the DF-effect observed in the 
list method DF task. More specifically, during recall the instruction to forget starts a process 
that blocks access to List 1 items (e.g. Bjork, 1989). Studies that have compared recall and 
recognition tasks in DF have showed that the DF effect is strong and robust for recall, but 
absent or very weak for recognition, and this has been used as evidence for an inhibitory 
explanation for DF (e.g. Bjork, 1989). Although DF most often is explained by inhibition 
mechanisms, alternative explanations for the DF effect have been proposed. For example, 
Sahakyan and  Kelley (2002) suggested that the DF effect can be attributed to a context 
change effect, more specifically the forget instruction causes an internal change in context, 
this new context is maintained during learning of list 2 and also during recollection, and 
causes reduced memory for List 1 items.   
The link between DF and inhibition has made the DF-paradigm especially interesting 
for research with clinical populations where suppression or intrusive recall is characteristic. A 
few studies have used the DF task to study recall and forgetting in trauma-exposed individuals 
hypothesising that trauma-exposed individuals are characterised by avoidant encoding. 
However, Moulds and Bryant (2002; 2005) are the only item-specific DF studies that support 
a hypothesis about avoidant encoding after trauma. Their studies showed that participants 
with acute stress disorder (ASD) were significantly better at forgetting trauma words 
compared to a group of trauma-exposed participants without ASD. In contrast, Zoellner et al. 
(2003) and McNally et al. (1998) did not find any evidence for avoidant encoding in trauma-
exposed participants with and without PTSD, rather they reported that trauma-exposed 
individuals remember trauma-related material very well.  
One study investigated DF in trauma-exposed individuals from a perspective 
hypothesising that intrusive memories, rather than avoidance and impaired voluntary recall, 
characterize cognition in PTSD (Cottencin et al., 2006). More specifically, they hypothesised 
that PTSD participants have an impaired inhibition mechanism, and hence would have 
difficulties inhibiting F-words, compared to non trauma-exposed controls. Trauma-exposed 
participants with PTSD and a non trauma-exposed control group completed a version of the 
item-cued DF task comprising immediate conditional recall, where participants were asked to 
recall R-words, and final unconditional recall where participants were asked to recall both R-
words and F-words. The results showed that in the immediate conditional recall condition the 
PTSD group recalled fewer R-words more F-words than controls. In the final recall task 
where participants were asked to recall both F- and R-words, the DF effect was reduced in the 
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PTSD group. The PTSD participants recalled fewer R-words, but there was no difference 
between groups in recall of F-words.  
Since depressed and trauma-exposed share several similar symptoms, like intrusive 
memories (e.g. Brewin et al., 1996) studies on intentional forgetting in depressed individuals 
studies might inform us about intentional forgetting in trauma-exposed people. One study 
with clinically depressed, clinically anxious and healthy controls investigated intentional 
forgetting in these individuals and reported a stronger rebound of depression relevant material 
in clinical depression. Power et al. (2000) argued that this finding might suggest a common 
mechanism in depression and PTSD, involving a stronger rebound effect for aversive 
personal-relevant information.  
In summary, the literature suggests that memory after trauma is better characterised by 
intrusive recollection rather than avoidant encoding and impaired recall of trauma-related 
memories. As discussed above, intrusive memories in the aftermath of trauma might result 
from an impaired ability to intentionally forget disturbing material. In line with this, Cottencin 
et al. (2006) found support for deficits in intentional forgetting of neutral material in 
participants with PTSD. However, as only neutral material was used, it cannot be determined 
if different patterns would emerge for emotional and trauma-specific material. Furthermore, 
Power et al. (2000) reported data showing stronger rebound of depression relevant material in 
clinical depression, and argued that the list method DF paradigm would be a good model for 
studying an enhanced rebound effects and intrusive memories also in PTSD. However, as far 
as we know no study has so far used a list method DF task to study intrusive memories in 
trauma-exposed participants. 
Mental time travel after trauma. A line of research has demonstrated a link between 
trauma and overgeneral autobiographical memories (OGM). That is, instead of retrieving 
memories from specific events, trauma-exposed individuals tend to refer to more general 
categorical memories. For example, if asked to retrieve a memory for the word “happy”, 
trauma-exposed individuals would be more likely to retrieve a general memory such as “every 
time I did well at school”, as opposed to a specific memory, e.g. “The time I got an A on a 
math-test”. 
A number of studies have demonstrated overgeneral retrieval in individuals exposed to 
a broad variety of traumatic events (e.g. Brennen et al., 2010; Dalgleish, Tchanturia, Serpell, 
Hems, Yiend, de Silva & Treasure, 2003; de Decker, Hermans, Raes & Eelen, 2003; 
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Henderson, Hargreaves, Gregory & Williams, 2002; Hermans, Van den Broeck, Belis, Raes, 
Pieter & Eelen, 2004; Kuyken & Brewin, 1995; Wessel, Merckelbach & Dekkers, 2002; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1996; Williams, Williams & Ghadiali, 1998).  Furthermore, 
overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM) is associated with PTSD (McNally, Lasko, 
Macklin & Pitman, 1995; McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin & Weather, 1994), acute stress 
disorder (ASD) (Harvey, Bryant & Dang, 1998), and with major depressive disorder (MDD) 
(Moore, Watts & Williams, 1988; Puffet, Jehin-Marchot, Timsit-Berthier & Timsit, 1991; 
Swales, Williams & Wood, 2001; Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz & Merchelbach, 2001; 
Williams & Scott, 1988). 
Potentially traumatic events are often followed by traumatic stress reactions such as 
emotional disturbances and psychological disorders, hence it is difficult to determine whether 
it is exposure to potentially traumatising events per se or if it is the disturbance or disorder 
following trauma that affects autobiographical memory retrieval. In a review of 24 studies, 
Moore and Zoellner (2007) concluded that trauma per se is not likely to lead to overgeneral 
memory, it is rather the symptoms of psychopathology after trauma that causes OGM.   
In his recent review, Brewin (2011) concluded that OGM has a predictive role in 
PTSD, however whether OGM has a direct causal role cannot be determined based on the 
current literature. As pointed out by Brewin (2011) it is not clear whether the predictive role 
of OGM is influenced by or can be accounted for by other factors. Several third variables 
have been suggested to account for the relationship between OGM and PTSD, such as 
rumination (Kleim, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007) and suppression (Schonfeld, Ehlers, 
Bollinghaus, & Rief, 2007). Another possible mediating variable might be disturbance in 
future directed thinking or future imageability. In the literature it is often noted that PTSD is 
associated with problems imagining the future and symptoms of future foreshortening (e.g. 
McNally, Lasko, Macklin & Pitman, 1995). McNally et al. (1995, p.629) suggested that “an 
inability to remember the past may be related to an inability to imagine the future”, thus in 
conditions where reduced specificity is found it might also be expected that future-directed 
thoughts have reduced specificity. However, as far as we are aware, this hypothesis has not 
been explored empirically. A relationship between trauma and specificity of future-directed 
thought might be of importance because, as suggested by Williams et al. (2007), an impaired 
ability to imagine specific events in the future can be related to the ability to solve problems 
in daily life. 
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As first highlighted by Tulving (1985; 2002), how we remember the past and how we 
imagine the future is intimately related. Tulving introduced the concept “mental time travel” 
and suggested that the same episodic memory system underpins how we remember the past 
and imagine the future. In line with this, several studies have demonstrated that there is a 
close relationship between memory and future-directed thinking. For example, deficits in 
autobiographical memory have been reported to be associated with deficits in future-directed 
thinking in various populations e.g. in amnesics (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & Maguire, 
2007), people suffering from schizophrenia (D’Argembeau, Raffard & Van der Linden, 
2008), and depressed patients (Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose & MacLeod, 1996). 
In summary, symptoms of psychopathology in the aftermath of trauma are associated 
with an impaired ability to retrieve specific autobiographical memories. Furthermore the 
specificity for autobiographical memories is closely related with specificity of future directed 
thoughts. However, no study has investigated the influence of trauma on specificity of future 
directed thoughts. 
 
Main research objectives 
Paper I 
The main objective in this study was to investigate an automatic form of forgetting, 
Retrieval Induced Forgetting, in a group of sexual-assault victims and a control group. Using 
a recognition-cued Retrieval Induced Forgetting Task (RIF), this study examined RIF with 
neutral, positive, negative and trauma-specific material. 
Paper II 
This study investigated intentional forgetting and intrusive recall of trauma-specific 
versus positive, neutral and threat related material in trauma- exposed participants and 
controls. One aim was to investigate whether hypothesised deficits in intentional forgetting 
after trauma are specific to processing of trauma-specific material, or if it reflects a general 
tendency for all types of material. More specifically, we investigated correct recall of 
Remember and Forget positive, neutral, threat-related and trauma-specific words in trauma-
exposed participants and controls. We also examined the relationship between trauma 
symptoms and depression symptoms and correct recall of Remember and Forget words 
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A second aim in this study was to investigate intrusive involuntary recollection of 
trauma-specific material versus positive, threat-related and neutral material. In order to 
investigate “intrusive recall”, a modified version of the list method Directed Forgetting Task 
was used. 
Paper III 
The general aim of this study was to investigate specificity and temporal distribution 
of future directed thoughts and autobiographical memories in trauma-exposed participants and 
controls. More specifically an aim was to study the relationship between symptoms of 
traumatic stress and level of specificity for autobiographical memories. Furthermore, based on 
literature showing that the specificity of AM and future directed thoughts are related 
(D’Argembeau & Raffard, 2008; Williams et al., 1996) we investigated whether the 
relationship between symptoms of traumatic stress and specificity would be the same for 
future directed thoughts.  
A second aim was to see if one can detect future foreshortening, as described in DSM-
IV, in trauma-exposed participants by comparing the temporal distribution of their future 
directed thoughts and autobiographical memory with those of controls. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
The trauma group consisted of 23 women, all of whom had experienced sexual assault 
in adulthood. The control group consisted of 23 non trauma-exposed women. The trauma 
group and the control group did not differ in age or years of education, however the trauma 
group scored higher on the clinical measures. The participants included in the study did not 
have any known injury or disease that could influence cognitive functions, they did not take 
any psychoactive drug or medication, and all participants were fluent in Norwegian. 
Participants in the trauma group were recruited from the Emergency Center in Bergen, 
the Emergency Center in Oslo, Dixi Resource Centre, and from the Center for Crisis 
Psychology in Bergen. Potential participants were introduced to the project by a social worker 
when they were attending a follow-up meeting at Emergency Center in Oslo or Bergen. Those 
that expressed interest in participating in the project were given a brief project description, 
and if they were still interested they wrote down their contact information and signed an 
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informed consent form stating that they were willing to be contacted regarding participation in 
the project. This procedure was also followed at Dixi Resource Centre, and Center for Crisis 
Psychology in Bergen, though here the participants were given the information when 
attending a support group. The people who gave their informed consent were later contacted 
by mail or telephone to schedule an appointment for participation.  Participants in the control 
group were recruited with posters at the University, on public transport and in grocery shops.  
 The process of recruiting trauma-exposed participants started in January 2008, and 
according to the progress plan we were planning to finish testing in December the same year. 
Our initial goal was to include 50 trauma-exposed participants and 50 controls. The first 
participant in the trauma-group was tested in May 2008. However, the recruiting of trauma-
exposed participants turned out to be much more difficult than initially anticipated; by the end 
of 2008 we had only recruited 6 participants. As a result we extended the period for recruiting 
and data collection, and lowered our goal for number of participants. The last trauma-exposed 
participant, number 23, was tested in March 2010.  Recruiting and testing of control 
participants was carried out between October 2009 and March 2010. 
 
Materials 
Self-report questionnaires were administered to assess post-trauma symptoms as well 
as depression and anxiety symptoms in all participants. Well-known self-report questionnaires 
with high reported levels of test-retest reliability and high internal consistency were used. 
Posttraumatic diagnostic scale (PDS). The posttraumatic diagnostic scale (PDS) is a 
standardised and validated 49 item self-report scale based on the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria 
for PTSD (Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997). The PDS asks the individual to identify the 
most disturbing traumatic experience and to assess the degree of physical threat or 
helplessness experienced during the episode. The PDS assesses the frequency and intensity of 
all symptoms listed in criteria B-D, as well as the criterion F functional impairment.  The PDS 
has a recommended cut off score of 27 (Griffin, Uhlmansiek, Resick, & Mechanic, 2004) 
 Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II). The BDI-II is used to measure current 
levels of depression (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). BDI-II is a self-administered inventory 
that contains 21 items. The respondents were shown statements and instructed to choose the 
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alternative that best described how they felt the “past two weeks, including today” on a scale 
from 0-3.  
The BDI-II is constructed to reflect the diagnostic criteria of MDD and is seen as an 
indicator on prevalence and severity of depressive symptoms in accordance with the 
diagnostic criteria of MDD as described in DSM IV (First & Tasman, 2004). The depressive 
symptoms and attitudes that is measured in the BDI-II are sadness, pessimism, feelings of 
failure, loss of pleasure, guilty feelings, punishment feelings, self-dislike, self-criticalness, 
suicidal thoughts or wishes, crying, agitation, loss of interest, indecisiveness, worthlessness, 
loss of energy, changes in sleeping pattern, irritability, changes in appetite, concentration 
difficulty, tiredness or fatigue, and loss of interest in sex (Beck et al., 1996). The depression 
score range from 0-63, were a total score of 0-13 is minimal, 14-19 is mild, 20-28 is medium, 
and 29-63 is severe. Beck and colleagues (1996) reported a test-retest correlation of .93 on a 
sample of 26 policlinic patients. 
                   Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (BAI). Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck, Epstein, 
Brown & Steer, 1988) is a 21-item self-report inventory measuring severity of anxiety. The 
BAI is constructed so that each item in the inventory represents an anxiety symptom. The 
respondents are asked to rate in what degree they have experienced each item “the last week, 
including today” on a 4-point scale (0-3) ranging from not at all (0) to severely – I could 
barely stand it (3). The total BAI score range from 0-63. A total score of 0-7 indicate minimal 
level of anxiety, 8-15 mild level of anxiety, 16-25 medium level of anxiety, and a score of 26-
63 indicate severe level of anxiety. Beck and colleagues (1988) reported high internal 
consistency (α=.92) and a test-retest correlation of .75. 
Impact of Event Scale (IES).  The Impact of Events Scale was developed to measure 
level of distress for adult survivors of traumatic events (Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, 1979). 
The original IES consisted of 15 items, and aimed to measure intrusion and avoidance 
symptoms. The IES has also been used to assess the reactions of trauma in adolescents (Sack, 
Seeley, Him & Clarke, 1998). The IES-R (Weiss & Marmar, 1997) is a revised version of the 
original IES. It is a self-report instrument and it consist of 22 items aimed to measure stress 
reactions commonly associated with PTSD; intrusion, avoidance and hyper-arousal. 
Participants are asked to rate 22 items in relation to “how distressing each difficulty has been 
during the past 7 days”. The items are rated on a 5 point scale ranging from 0-not at all to 4-
extremely. The intrusion subscale measures the degree of memories that intrudes the 
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consciousness of the individuals against their wish. The avoidance subscale is used to 
measure the degree of which memories of trauma is consciously suppressed. The hyper-
arousal scale aims to measure irritability and anger: jumpiness and exaggerated startle 
response: trouble concentrating: psychophysiological arousal: and hyper-vigilance (Weiss & 
Marmar, 1997). The total IES-R score ranges from 0-88. The internal consistency of the scale 
is reported to be high; one study reported the intrusion subscale to have an alpha coefficient of 
.91 and the avoidance subscale to have an alpha coefficient of .85 and hyper arousal .90 
(Weiss & Marmar, 1997). Test-retest correlation of .57 for intrusion, avoidance .51, and 
hyperarousal .59 has been reported (Weiss & Marmar, 1997). 
The Dissociative Experience Scale (DES). The DES is a self-administered scale 
developed by Bernstein and Putman (1986). This scale is not developed to serve as a 
diagnostic instrument, it is rather an instrument aimed at reflecting the general dissociative 
traits of a person (Cardeña & Weiner, 2004). The scale consists of 28 items, with a numerical 
scale from 0 to 100 in 10 point intervals, with higher scores indicating higher dissociative 
tendencies (Bernstein & Putman, 1986). A review of previous studies with the DES reported 
test-retest reliabilities ranging from .78 to .96. (for an overview see Carlson & Putnam, 1993).   
Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ). The CEQ was developed by 
Merckelbach, Muris, and Rassin (1999). The questionnaire includes 25 dichotomous (yes/no) 
items aimed at measuring experiences related to imagining, daydreaming, and intense 
fantasizing. The questionnaire includes statements, such as “as a child, I sometimes had the 
feeling of being another person” and “I often confuse fantasies with real memories”. The CEQ 
has shown a test-retest correlation of .95 and with regards to the internal consistency of the 
questionnaire, an alpha coefficient of .72 has been reported (Merckelbach, Horselenberg & 
Muris, 2001).  
The DES and the CEQ were not reported in any of the three papers. 
Memory tasks 
 The Retrieval Induced Forgetting Task (RIF). The Retrieval-Induced 
Forgetting task (RIF) is used to study how repeated retrieval practice of particular memories 
impairs retrieval of related memory traces (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). In the RIF task 
participants are asked to learn lists of categorically organised words. Subsequently, some of 
the words from some of the categories are practiced in a word-stem completion task. Finally, 
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the participants are asked to recall the words from the initial study-list, and memory for three 
types of items were examined: retrieval practiced items (Rp+), nonpracticed competitors from 
the same category (Rp-), and baseline items from nonpracticed categories (Nrp).  
In the study presented in paper I a recognition-cued RIF procedure was used; response 
time and accuracy were the dependent variables. The study-list consisted of 12 categories and 
96 exemplars. The categories and associated exemplars were organised in three distinct 
categories for each of the following conditions: trauma-specific, negative, neutral and 
positive. Each of the categories in the study-list consisted of a category name, and 8 
associated exemplars. On the recognition test, all of these words were presented. Additionally, 
48 Extralist Unrelated words and 48 Extralist Related words were presented on the 
recognition test. 
We used the positive and neutral lists from Dehli and Brennen’s (2009) study. For the 
trauma-specific and negative word lists, seven psychology students were asked to generate as 
many trauma-specific and negative categories and associated exemplars as possible. Three 
other students rated all the words (trauma-specific, negative, neutral, positive) for emotional 
valence on a scale from -3 to 3, additionally they were asked to indicate on a scale from 0 to 3 
in what degree each word were associated with rape. The frequency of each word was 
estimated using the Oslo Corpus of Tagged Norwegian Texts database 
(http://www.tekstlab.uio.no/norsk/bokmaal/english.html). 
A one-way ANOVA with the independent variable of emotional valence showed that 
there were no significant difference in frequency of the words between levels of valence 
F(3,140)=.79, ns. A one-way ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference in 
word length between levels of valence F(3,140)  = .66, ns.  The word lists were also rated for 
degree of integration. Five independent raters were asked to indicate on a scale from 1-5 to 
what degree each of the 12 lists was coherent or integrated. The ratings showed high level of 
coherence for the lists in all emotional categories, neutral (M=4.67, SD=.29), positive 
(M=4.67, SD=.14), negative (M=4.58, SD=.08), trauma-Specific (M=4.08, SD=.09).  
 The Directed Forgetting Task (DF). In the Directed forgetting task participants are 
presented to lists of words with a following instruction to either remember or to forget the 
presented words. In the study presented in paper II two lists of words were presented to the 
participants. Each list consisted of 8 positive, 8 neutral, 8 threat-related, and 8 rape-related 
words. Across participants, the lists served an equal number of times as the Remember-list 
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(R) and the Forget-list (F). A modified version of the list DF was used. In this study, all 
participants were first asked only to recall the second list: the R-words. 
The words used in the DF task were generated in a focus group, 7 students were asked 
to come up with as many as possible words in the four categories. For the threat-related words 
the students were instructed to come up with words that are associated with traumatic 
experiences, but not associated with rape (e.g. traffic accident, massacre, fire). Three other 
students were asked to evaluate the words for emotional content on a scale from -3 to 3, 
additionally they were asked to indicate on a scale from 0-3 to what degree each word was 
associated with rape. The frequency of each word was estimated using the Oslo Corpus of 
Tagged Norwegian Texts database (http://www.tekstlab.uio.no/norsk/bokmaal/english.html). 
A one-way ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference in frequency between 
levels of valence, F (3,76)=.41,ns. A one-way ANOVA showed that there was a significant 
difference in word length between levels of valence, F(3,76)=.4.54, p < .01. Words in the 
neutral valence category had significantly shorter word length compared to positive words 
t(30) = 3.60, p < .001, compared to threat-related words t(30) = 2.93, p < .005, and compared 
to trauma-specific words t(30) = 3.46, p < .001. 
The Autobiographical Memory Task. Specificity of autobiographical memories is 
often measured by the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). 
The AMT consists of cue words, where the valences of the cue words alternates between 
positive, like “optimistic”, negative, like “sad”, and neutral words, like “garden”. In the study 
reported in paper III  every cue word was embedded in a sentence, e.g. “Try to imagine an 
episode form the past associated with the word garden”. The cue words will be presented to 
the participants alternating positive, negative and neutral.  
  In response to each cue word, the participants were asked to recall a specific memory 
of a particular event that occurred within the time span of one day. The instruction was shown 
on the computer screen and stated: “You will now see some sentences on the screen. The task 
is to describe a specific event that happened in the past to each sentence. A specific event is 
an episode that takes place within the time span of one day. The event that you describe can 
have happened either in close or distant future.”  The participants were first asked to practise 
on three cue words. A computer based version of the AMT was used and the answers were 
given in writing. Each word was present on the screen for as long as it took for the participant 
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to write down the memory, however if no response was started after 60 seconds, a new cue 
sentence would appear on the screen. Following each response to the cue sentences they 
participants were asked to state when the described memory happened, they were asked to 
write down how many days, months or years it is since the episode happened.  
The Future Cueing Task. The future cueing task was first used by Williams and 
colleagues (1996) to measure the specificity of with which participants imagine their future. 
The participants were asked to imagine future events in response to positive, negative and 
neutral cue words. The instruction was shown on the computer screen and stated: “You will 
now see some sentences on the screen. The task is to describe a specific event in the future to 
each sentence. A specific event is an episode that takes place within the time span of one day. 
Try to imagine an event that is likely to happen, the event that you describe can happen either 
in close or distant future.” As in the AMT, the cue sentences were shown on the computer 
screen for as long as it took for the participant to write down a story, however if no response 
was started within 60 seconds a new cue sentence were presented. After each story the 
participants were asked to state in how many days, months or years this event would be likely 
to happen. 
Two lists of words were used in the AMT/FCT, half of the participants were given list 
1 in the AMT and list 2 in the FCT, and the other half were presented to list 2 in the AMT and 
list 1 in the FCT. The two word lists, was each composed by 5 positive, 5 negative and 5 
neutral cue words were used. The frequency of each word was estimated using the Oslo 
Corpus of Tagged Norwegian Texts database 
(http://www.tekstlab.uio.no/norsk/bokmaal/english.html). The word lists were also rated for 
emotional content by three raters, who did not participate in the main task. The raters were 
asked to indicate the emotional valence for each word on a scale from -3 to 3.  List 1 and 2 
was matched so that it was no difference in either frequency or emotional valence. 
A one-way ANOVA with the independent variable of emotional valence showed that 
there was no significant difference in frequency of the words between levels of valence 
F(2,27) = .98, ns. Mean emotional content was calculated for each level of valence, positive 
words (M = 2.50, SD =.39), Negative (M = 2.06, SD = .38), Neutral words (M = .20, SD = 
.35).  
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Procedure 
The participants were tested individually in a quiet lab by the first author. Prior to 
testing the participants were informed about the project, about their right to at any time 
withdraw from the project, and they were asked to read and sign an informed consent form if 
willing to participate in the project.  
 The participants were then asked to fill out a questionnaire on background information 
about age, years of education, use of psychoactive medication, alcohol consumption, use of 
drugs, use of psychoactive medication, and time passed since traumatic episode. They were 
also asked if they had epilepsy, known brain injury or previous psychotic episode. 
 Next, the DF was administered, followed by the DES, the AMT and FCT, CEQ, RIF, 
PDS, IES, BDI and the BAI. All participants had a 20 minutes break after the AMT/FCT task, 
they also had additional short breaks between the tasks. The complete procedure included 
breaks lasted between 2 and 3.5 hours. The procedures for each memory task are described in 
detail in the manuscripts. 
 The only difference in procedure for the two groups concerned the IES, here the 
control group was asked to think back and refer to the most traumatic event they had 
experienced in their life. 
 
Statistical analysis 
All data were analysed using The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
for Windows (version 16.0 and 18.0; Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). One-way between-groups 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to calculate group differences in continuous 
demographic variables and scores on questionnaires. 
Paper I. For both reaction time and retrieval accuracy, mixed ANOVAs were carried 
out with Valence (positive, neutral, negative and trauma-specific) and Retrieval Practice (Rp-, 
Nrp) as within-subject factors and Group (trauma, controls) as between-subjects factor. 
Significant interactions were broken down with t-tests. 
Paper II. A mixed ANOVA was computed to investigate the possible effect and 
interaction effects of Group, Instruction and Valence on the correct recall of F and R words. 
Similarly, a mixed ANOVA was calculated with the between subjects factor of Group 
(trauma, control) and the within subject factor Valence (positive, neutral, threat-related, 
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trauma-specific) for F-words mistakenly recalled in the Remember condition. When 
significant interactions were found, these were broken down with t-tests. 
Pearson’s correlations were performed to investigate possible relationship between 
mean numbers of correct recalled F and R words and scores on the IES, PDS, BDI and BAI. 
Also, Pearson’s correlations were performed to investigate the relationship between IES 
scores and mistakenly recalled F-words. 
Paper III. A mixed ANOVA was performed for specific responses with Task (Future 
vs. Past) and Valence (positive vs. negative vs. neutral) as within-subject factors, and Group 
(trauma vs. control) as between-subject factor. 
Pearson’s correlations were performed to investigate possible relationship between 
proportion of specific responses on the FCT and the AMT and scores on the IES, PDS, BDI 
and BAI. Also, Pearson’s correlations were calculated to examine the relationship between 
future specificity and autobiographical memory specificity. In addition, the data was using a 
mediation model method following bootstrap approach suggested by Preacher & Hayes 
(2004). These analyses were carried out to investigate a possible mediating role of depression 
scores (BDI-II) and trauma scores (IES) in a suggested relationship between trauma exposure 
and specificity. 
For temporal distribution for both the FCT and AMT responses separate one-way 
ANOVAs with the independent variable of group were computed to investigate possible 
group difference for each of the define time bins. 
 
Ethical considerations  
Some of the participants in the present study had experienced severe traumatic events, 
and some of the materials used were specifically related to trauma. Thus, special 
considerations were made to secure the well-being of the participants and to minimize the risk 
of re-traumatisation during testing. During recruiting of participants we made sure that 
potential participants experienced no pressure to participate in the study. Prior to testing we 
put emphasis on the right to at any time withdraw for the study. Furthermore, during testing 
we were especially sensitive towards potential discomfort among participants, and were ready 
to abort the session if such was observed. After testing the participants were debriefed, and 
were invited to ask questions about the study and their participation. Clinical backup were 
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available during testing.  The project was approved by the Regional Committee for Research 
Ethics (REK-sør) and the Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD).  
It should be noted that none of the participants expressed particular discomfort during 
testing, and furthermore the testing did not trigger any observable negative reaction. 
Participants expressed that participation was experienced as interesting and meaningful. 
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Summary of papers 
Paper I: Retrieval-induced forgetting after trauma: A study with victims of 
sexual assault 
The Retrieval-Induced Forgetting (RIF) paradigm is used to study how the repeated retrieval 
practice of particular memories impairs the retrieval of related memory traces. A study is 
reported where this automatic form of forgetting is investigated in a group of sexual-assault 
victims and a control group. Using a recognition-cued RIF task, this study examined RIF with 
neutral, positive, negative and trauma-specific stimuli. Response time data showed that 
irrespective of previous trauma exposure, a RIF effect was observed for neutral material, but 
not for emotional material. No differences in RIF between the trauma group and the control 
group were found. The present findings suggest that the mechanisms operating in the RIF task 
might be resistant to emotional material, and that RIF does not operate on emotional material 
even when it is relevant to a trauma that participants have been through.   
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Paper II: Intentional forgetting of emotional words after trauma: A study with 
victims of sexual assault 
Following exposure to a trauma, people tend to experience intrusive thoughts and memories 
about the event. In order to investigate whether intrusive memories in the aftermath of trauma 
might be accounted for by an impaired ability to intentionally forget disturbing material, the 
present study used a Directed Forgetting (DF) task to examine intentional forgetting and 
intrusive recall of words in sexual assault victims and controls. By including words related to 
the trauma in addition to neutral, positive and threat-related stimuli it was possible to test for 
trauma-specific effects. No difference between the Trauma and the Control group was found 
for correct recall of forget or remember words. However, when recalling words from 
remember list, the Trauma group mistakenly recalled significantly more trauma-specific 
words from the forget list.  
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Paper III: Mental time travel after trauma: The specificity and temporal 
distribution of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts 
This study investigated the relationship between trauma exposure and specificity and 
temporal distribution of autobiographical memories and future directed thoughts. A group of 
sexual assault victims were compared with women without previous trauma exposure in 
relation to specificity of autobiographical memories, as measured by the Autobiographical 
Memory Task (AMT) and specificity of future directed thoughts as measured by the Future 
Cueing Task (FCT). The temporal distribution of future directed thoughts and 
autobiographical memories was studied by asking the participants to estimate when each 
memory reported on the AMT had occurred and when each future event reported on the FCT 
would occur. The results showed no difference between the trauma group and the controls in 
specificity of autobiographical memories nor future directed thoughts. In line with a review of 
Moore and Zoellner (2007), a relationship between PTSD symptoms as measured by the 
Impact of Event Scale (IES) and reduced specificity was found. Furthermore, we found no 
difference in temporal distribution of future directed thoughts or autobiographical memories 
between trauma-exposed participants and controls. The results provide some evidence that 
trauma symptoms only influence the specificity of mental time travel to the past, and not to 
the future. 
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Discussion 
Forgetting emotional material after trauma exposure 
Impaired inhibition mechanisms have been suggested to underlie intrusive thoughts 
and memories in trauma-exposed individuals. In paper I, an aim was to investigate automatic 
inhibition using a RIF task in trauma-exposed individuals and controls. In paper II one of the 
aims was to investigate a voluntary type of inhibition, intentional forgetting. An overarching 
aim in paper I and II was to investigate whether hypothesised deficits in memory processes in 
trauma-exposed individuals are specific to processing of trauma- related material or a more 
general deficit of memory. 
In paper I, the results showed no differences in RIF between trauma-exposed 
participants and controls. Interestingly, the response time data showed that irrespective of 
previous trauma exposure, a RIF effect was observed for neutral material, but not for 
emotional material. Hence, we found no support for either a general deficit or a trauma-
specific deficit  in RIF in trauma-exposed people.  
The results in the RIF study are in contrast to the only previous study investigating 
RIF in trauma-exposed individuals. Amir and colleagues reported no RIF effect in trauma-
exposed individuals with and without PTSD and for both neutral and threatening cue words, 
the controls however showed RIF for all types of words.  In the present study, no differences 
between groups were found. Hence, while Amir et al.’s (2009) study indicates a general 
inhibition deficit for trauma-exposed people, our results suggests that emotional material in 
general, regardless of valence and previous trauma exposure, are resistant to RIF.  
There are a number of differences between the present RIF study and the study of 
Amir et al. (2009) that might have contributed to the different findings. First, Amir et al.’s 
study employed a recall task in their RIF paradigm, while the present study used a recognition 
cued RIF task.  However, a reaction-timed cue- independent recognition-test, as used in the 
study presented in Paper III, has proven to be a successful approach to study RIF effects, and 
several studies have reported the typical RIF effect using RT as dependent variable (Perfect et 
al., 2002, Experiment 5; Veling & Knippenberg, 2004, Experiment 1). 
Assuming that RIF reflects automatic inhibition, as suggested by Anderson (2003), the 
present findings suggest that automatic inhibition does not operate on emotional material, 
even when it is relevant for a trauma that participants have been through. The absence of RIF 
for emotional material is in line with the results from Moulds et al.’s (2006) study where no 
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RIF on accuracy rates was found for emotional words in high and low dysphoric participants, 
and also with Dehli & Brennen’s (2009) study where no RIF on either RT or accuracy was 
observed for positive or negative emotional words in healthy participants. Taken together, it 
seems like the mechanisms operating in the RIF task might be resistant to emotional material. 
A general tendency for reduced forgetting of emotional material fits nicely with the well 
established finding that emotional material is generally better remembered than neutral 
material (McNally, 2003). 
That emotional material is resistant to the type of automatic inhibition observed in RIF 
might have different consequences for non trauma-exposed healthy individuals as opposed to 
trauma-exposed individuals. For non trauma-exposed healthy individuals this tendency might 
be relatively harmless and perhaps be reflected in rumination over previous negative or 
positive experiences. For people who have survived trauma however, the very same tendency 
might have a more negative impact, because the memories that repeatedly intrude into 
consciousness are experienced as very disturbing by the individual. The uncomfortable 
consequences of intrusive memories from a traumatic experience, might lead trauma victims 
to avoid such memories through intentional forgetting, however this has not been studied 
extensively for trauma-related material. 
Paper II investigated intentional forgetting and intrusive recollection of emotional 
material. There was no difference between the trauma-exposed and the non trauma-exposed 
participants for correct recall of forget words or remember words.  The data gave no support 
to either a hypothesis about a general or a trauma-specific deficit in intentional forgetting for 
trauma-exposed individuals, as measured by voluntary recall of F-words on the DF task. The 
absence of group differences for correct recall of any word valence for both R- or F-words 
contrasts with previous findings (Cottencin et al., 2006). However, the modified DF-task used 
in this study limits the conclusions we can draw about intentional forgetting, especially due to 
possible influence of order. 
The modification of the DF-paradigm did however allow us to study intrusive recall of 
F-words. The results showed the trauma-exposed participants mistakenly retrieved more 
trauma-specific F-words when asked to recall R-words, both relative to controls, and 
compared to the number of positive, neutral and threat-related F-words they mistakenly 
recalled. The tendency for involuntary intrusive recollection of trauma-specific words in the 
trauma group and simultaneous the lack of group differences in intentional forgetting or 
correct recall of R and F-words might be explained by a source monitoring deficit for trauma-
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specific material for the trauma group. Perhaps it is more difficult for the trauma-exposed 
individuals to know whether a trauma-specific word originates from the remember or the 
forget list? Our data does not allow for any conclusions about possible mechanisms, however 
it might be speculated that trauma-specific material is more self-relevant and integrated for 
the trauma-group and that this makes it more difficult to determine the source of the items.  
These results are in line with a study by Brennen, Dybdahl and Kapidžić (2007) who 
reported that participants with PTSD mistakenly recalled more trauma-specific critical lures in 
the DRM paradigm compared to trauma-exposed controls. For neutral lists however there was 
no difference between groups in false recall. Brennen et al.’s (2007) results can be understood 
as a trauma-specific source monitoring error in PTSD. The results of the present DF study can 
be interpreted in line with this, but suggests that such a deficit also can arise in trauma-
exposed individuals without a diagnosis of PTSD. 
In summary, the results from paper I and II did not provide evidence to support a 
hypothesis about impaired inhibition mechanisms in trauma-exposed individuals, or a 
hypothesis about deficits in inhibition mechanisms underlying trauma symptoms. However, 
the two studies used cue words, and it can be questioned to what extent processing of 
emotional words can inform us about inhibition of real autobiographical memories. Moreover, 
the use of emotional cue words will probably not evoke emotion to the same extent as 
autobiographical memories.  
 
Mental time travel after trauma 
In paper III, a study on specificity and temporal distribution of autobiographical 
memories and future directed thoughts, the results showed a relationship between trauma 
symptoms and reduced specificity of autobiographical memories, however no such 
relationship was found for future directed thoughts. 
The relationship between symptoms of PTSD and OGM is in line with the conclusion 
drawn in Moore and Zoellner’s (2007) review; OGM is associated with symptoms of 
psychopathology and not with trauma exposure per se. Furthermore, mediation analyses 
confirmed this association showing that level of trauma symptoms as measured by IES act as 
a mediator between trauma exposure and autobiographical memory specificity. However, 
contrary to our hypothesis, future directed thoughts showed no relationship with either trauma 
exposure or symptoms of trauma exposure and specificity. This is in contrast with previous 
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literature showing corresponding levels of specificity of autobiographical memories and 
future directed thoughts (e.g. D’Argembeau & Raffard, 2008;  Dickson & Bates , 2006; 
Williams et al., 1996, Experiment 1). Also, these findings do not provide support for 
McNally’s (1995) suggestion that OGM underlies problems with imagining the future in 
PTSD. The results rather suggest that trauma symptoms only influence the specificity of 
mental time travel to the past, and not to the future. 
Differences in results between studies can be influenced by a number of factors such 
as differences in concreteness of the cue words used and differences in procedure for the 
FCT/AMT. Furthermore, rating of data in studies using the FCT and AMT is challenging, in 
the present study the mean Cohen’s kappa for the AMT was .77. For the FCT the mean 
Cohen’s Kappa was .68. This also shows that rating of future directed thoughts are somewhat 
more difficult than rating of autobiographical memories. Future studies should ask the 
participants themselves to rate specificity level, and also other phenomenological 
characteristics of the memories that will allow for a closer examination of the relationship 
between trauma exposure, trauma symptoms and future and past episodic thoughts. 
The results reported in paper III showed no difference in temporal distribution of 
future directed thoughts between trauma-exposed participants and controls. Hence, we found 
no support for future foreshortening in terms of an altered temporal pattern for future directed 
thoughts after trauma. However, few cue words were used in the present study, a higher 
number cue words would allow for a more nuanced analysis of the temporal pattern.  
 
Cognitive control mechanisms and memory processes 
The literature on cognitive processing in PTSD has focused on two main processes: 
memory and cognitive control (Banich, Mackiewicz, Depue, Whitmer, Miller, & Heller, 
2009). Disturbances in these two processes have been thought to underlie symptoms such as 
intrusive memories, fragmented memory after trauma, and hyper-vigilance. Memory 
processes and cognitive control processed in PTSD has mainly been considered as separate, 
however as suggested by Banich and colleagues in a recent review there are reasons to start to 
explore the relationship between these two processes (Banich et al., 2009). 
Updating and monitoring of information in working memory, switching between 
mental sets or tasks, response selection, and inhibition of dominant responses are main aspects 
of executive functions that have been suggested to underlie cognitive control (Miyake et al., 
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2000). Cognitive control is a relevant concept for all three studies and the associated memory 
processes addressed in the present thesis.   
Impaired cognitive control might be a relevant third variable in the relationship 
between reduced specificity of autobiographical memories and post-trauma symptoms.  
Retrieval of specific autobiographical memories is a generative process that necessitates 
monitoring and executive capacity (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Lack of cognitive 
capacity might result in a truncated search for a specific memory in the autobiographical 
knowledge base. Furthermore, in his CaRFAX model, Williams (2006) proposed that 
executive control dysfunction can be underlying OGM.  According to Williams (1996) model 
of autobiographical memory retrieval, a search for a specific memory involves inhibition of 
related category descriptions in memory. More specifically, failure to inhibit a category 
description results in a truncated search and a generic memory. According to this view, it 
might be hypothesised that impaired inhibition mechanism underlies OGM. Although the 
present study did not systematically address cognitive control mechanism, the RIF paradigm 
and the DF paradigm are thought to measure of two types of inhibition mechanism. Thus, it is 
interesting to explore the relationship between these two types of inhibition and retrieval 
specificity of autobiographical memories and future directed thoughts. 
To investigate the relationship between RIF and specificity, correlation analyses 
between RT RIF size for each level of valence (positive, negative, neutral, trauma-specific) 
and level of specificity of the AMT and FCT, was computed. These analyses did not show 
any significant correlations, all p’s<.1. 
To investigate the relationship between intentional forgetting and specificity, a “DF 
score” was computed by subtracting the number of correctly recalled R-words from number 
correctly recalled F-words. Next, Pearson’s correlations between DF score and specificity 
level was computed. Also, Pearson’s correlations between correctly recalled R-words and F-
words and specificity level were computed. All analyses were computed both for all levels of 
valence on the DF and separately for each level of valence. None of the correlations turned 
out significant, all p’s<.1.  
 
How do the present findings fit with cognitive models of PTSD? 
Overall, the results reported in paper I and II suggest, in line with Rubin et al.’s (2008) 
model, that normal memory mechanisms operate in trauma-exposed people. The findings 
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from paper I showed that RIF is eradicated for emotional material independent of previous 
trauma exposure. This can be interpreted in line with Rubin et al.’s (2008) model which holds 
that ordinary mechanisms of memory can explain symptoms of PTSD. If emotional material 
in general is resistant to mechanism of forgetting, as suggested by the RIF study presented 
here, this might have different consequences for trauma-exposed individuals compared to non 
trauma-exposed individuals. According to Rubin et al.’s (2008) model it is the memory of the 
traumatic event and not the event itself that determines trauma symptoms. In terms of this 
model, it can be argued that the consequences of absent RIF for emotional material might 
depend of the memories of the traumatic event. For trauma-exposed individuals who might 
have more disturbing memories associated with the traumatic event, the absence of RIF might 
have a more negative impact because the memories that repeatedly intrude into consciousness 
are experienced as very disturbing by the individual. 
As pointed out by Berntsen, Rubin and Bohni (2008), emotional stress enhances both 
encoding of and access to a memory, thus both involuntary and voluntary memory recall will 
be enhanced for traumatic episodes. In line with this, the findings from paper II showed 
enhanced level of “intrusive recall” of trauma-specific material for the trauma-exposed 
participants. However, we did not find a higher level of voluntary recall of trauma-specific 
material. A slightly different view was proposed by Ehlers and Clark (2000) and Brewin et al. 
(1996), these theories predict that voluntary recall of the traumatic event are impaired and 
involuntary recollection is enhanced. However, paper II showed a pattern of results where 
involuntary recall of trauma-specific material was enhanced, but there was no evidence for 
impaired voluntary recall of trauma-specific material. 
Brewin et al.’s (1996) and Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) theories hold that disturbances in 
memory in the aftermath of trauma are specifically related to processing of the traumatic 
episode or material related to the traumatic episode. In paper I and II we found no evidence 
for any general deficits in RIF or intentional forgetting. However, the results from paper II 
showed one trauma-specific finding with the enhanced level of “intrusive recall” of trauma-
specific material for the trauma-exposed participants. It should be noted that this effect can 
most likely be explained by other ordinary memory mechanisms. For example it can be 
suggested that trauma-specific material is more self-relevant to the trauma-exposed 
participants and also more closely integrated with each other. However, paper II cannot 
conclude fully on this, hence this is an empirical question to be investigated. 
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The results reported in paper III showed that trauma symptoms are related to reduced 
specificity of autobiographical memories. This suggests a general deficit in autobiographical 
memory, for memories that are not related to trauma. The role of reduced specificity of 
autobiographical memories is not specified in any of Rubin et al.’s (2008), Brewin et al.’s 
(1996) or Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) theories. However, Ehlers and Clark (2000, p. 327) 
propose that the “general organisation of their autobiographical memory knowledge base 
may be disturbed“ in people with PTSD who have experienced to have the view of 
themselves seriously threatened. The relationship between specificity of autobiographical 
memory and trauma symptoms is robust and has important clinical implications, and should 
be considered in future models of PTSD.  
 
Methodological considerations 
In the present project one threat to validity lies in the recruiting of participants. The 
participants in the trauma-group might not be a representative sample for sexually abused 
individuals. The trauma-exposed participants were recruited either by healthcare personnel at 
emergency units or at an interest organisation for survivors of sexual abuse. It is well known 
that only a proportion of victims of sexual abuse seek professional help, hence the participants 
in the present project represent only individuals that seek help, and it cannot be ruled out that 
the results might have been different for trauma-exposed individuals that we did not reach 
through our recruiting strategy. Furthermore, we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
individuals that chose to participate in the project are different on factors relevant for 
performance on the tasks in the present study. For example, it might be suggested that the 
trauma-exposed individuals that have higher levels of avoidance are not included in our 
sample. 
The control group was recruited by displaying posters in grocery shops and on public 
transportation. Those that chose to participate in a “project about trauma and memory” might 
have done so because of a particular interest, thus representativity of this sample might also 
be questioned. To meet this problem, participants in the two groups were matched on age, 
gender and years of education. Ideally, more factors such as working memory capacity and 
intelligence could have been included when matching participants but practical consideration 
prevented this. However, several questionnaires on mental health variables were included, 
allowing us to assess the mental health of both groups. 
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The procedure and events that take place during testing can also influence the results 
(Pedhazur & Shmelkin, 1991). In the present project, the same individuals participated in the 
three different cognitive tasks. In addition questionnaires were administered, and the average 
duration of participation was about 3 hours. Both the length of testing and the content of the 
tests and questionnaires can be argued to influence the results.  Of particular concern is how 
completing the depression inventory and the trauma-inventories might affect the trauma-
group. To avoid any differential influence between groups due to filling the questionnaires, 
the order of tests and questionnaires were carefully considered.  The questionnaires measuring 
trauma symptoms and depression were conducted after the cognitive tasks, because answering 
these questions might alter the mood state especially for the trauma-exposed participants. 
Furthermore, the IES and the PDS contains questions and formulations that could be mixed up 
with the trauma-specific words in the DF and the RIF.  
Relevant to all three papers is ecological validity. The concept of ecological validity 
refers to two related constructs: representativeness and generalisability. Representativity 
concerns whether the tasks used represent the phenomenon as it occurs in everyday life 
(Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 2004). Generalisability refers to what extent the results can explain 
similar processes in everyday life (Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 2004). The tasks used in paper I and 
II involves encoding and retrieval of word lists. It can be questioned to what extent RIF or DF 
of emotional stimuli can inform us about automatic inhibition, intrusive memories and 
intentional forgetting of real autobiographical memories. Moreover, the use of emotional cue 
words will probably not evoke emotion to the same extent as autobiographical memories. 
Hence, to get a clearer picture of RIF and DF in trauma-exposed individuals future studies 
should employ autobiographical material in these tasks. 
A related issue is whether the cue words in the trauma-specific categories in the DF 
and RIF study are really associated with the traumatic episode the participants have been 
through. To this end, the trauma-related words were validated by asking independent student 
raters to evaluate to what extent each word was associated with rape. However, future studies 
using trauma-specific material should validate trauma words in a sample of trauma survivors, 
rather than in healthy student controls.  
Regarding ecological validity for the study presented in paper III, it might be 
questioned whether a cue word task is the most appropriate method to study recall or future 
directed thinking in everyday life. It might be suggested that spontaneously generated past 
43 
 
and future thoughts might better represent mental time travel in everyday life and 
consequently be a more ecologically valid method to study the influence of trauma on this 
form of cognition.  
Statistical conclusion validity. Statistical conclusion validity refers to the appropriate 
use of statistics to infer whether the presumed independent and dependent variables covary, 
and to the strength of which they covary (Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002). Incorrect 
conclusions about the existence of a relationship between two variables might involve 
concluding that two variables covary when they in fact do not (Type I error), or concluding 
that two variables do not covary when they in fact do (Type II error). There are several threats 
to statistic conclusion validity, two of which are of particular relevance to the present project; 
low statistical power and inaccurate effect size estimation. 
Statistical power refers to “the probability that a statistical test will reject the null 
hypothesis when it is false” (Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002). Low statistical power can 
lead to incorrect conclusions about the relationship between variables. More precisely low 
statistical power is associated with inaccurate estimates of effect size and an increased risk of 
Type II error (Shadish et al., 2002). Statistical power is determined by factors such as size of 
experimental effects, level of errors in the experiments and statistical analysis (Shadish et al., 
2002). In the present study matching of groups, control for possible confounders and high 
level of experimental control are factors that can be argued to contribute to higher statistical 
power. Several factors might compromise statistical power, and in the present studies, 
sampling issues are of particular relevance. With all other factors being equal, studies with 
bigger sample have higher statistical power. In the present project we had a relatively small 
sample, with 23 participants in each of the two groups, and no possibility of increasing the 
sample size. However, in all three papers significant effects were obtained, this suggests that 
despite a relatively small sample size significant effects can be detected. 
In recent years there has been an increasing awareness about the importance of 
reporting effect size. However, inaccurate effect size estimation is presented by Shadish et al. 
(2002) as one threat to statistical conclusion validity. Several factors determine the accuracy 
of effect size estimations, for example outliers or the use of an inadequate effect size measure 
can compromise estimation of effect size. In the present project eta squared, η2, was reported 
for all significant effects.  Eta-squared is a simple measure of effect size and reflects “the 
sums of squares for the effect divided by the total sum of squares” (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007, p.112). Thus, Eta-squared reflects the percentage of the variance in the DV’s explained 
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by the IVs in the particular sample. A disadvantage with eta-squared is that it is slightly 
upwardly biased, it generally overestimates the effect size in the population the sample is 
drawn from. An alternative to the eta-squared would have been to use omega-square as this 
analysis adjust for the overestimation. However, to decrease the possibility to commit type-II 
error, Eta-squared seemed to be more appropriate in the present study. 
Trauma-exposed versus PTSD. The trauma-exposed participants in the present 
project were not under formal treatment, and they did not have a formal diagnosis of PTSD. 
Hence, one can not know whether the findings in the present study can be generalised to a 
clinical sample of PTSD patients. However, data on trauma symptoms were obtained through 
the IES and the PDS, and when following the recommended cut-off score on the PDS 11 
participants were found to qualify for a PTSD diagnosis and 14 did not. Our analyses and 
subsequent conclusions however concerned the relationship between trauma exposure and 
performance on the memory tasks, and the relationship between trauma-symptom scores and 
performance on the memory tasks.  
Most people exposed to severe trauma do not have a diagnosis of PTSD, and studying 
trauma-exposed individuals without a diagnosis of PTSD might give us new insight on the 
impact of trauma on cognitive functioning.  
Future directions 
Intentional forgetting. Paper II investigated intentional forgetting and intrusive 
recollection of neutral, positive, threat-related and trauma-specific cue words. However, the 
alterations made in design in order to investigate intrusive recollection limit the conclusion we 
can draw about intentional forgetting per se. Hence, future studies should further investigate 
intentional forgetting of trauma-specific, positive, negative and neutral material in trauma-
exposed people.  Also, directed forgetting studies using autobiographical material should be 
carried out in future research. Moreover future studies should investigate intrusive 
recollection of trauma-specific versus non trauma related emotional material, and an aim 
should be to explore possible underlying mechanisms. 
Mental time travel after trauma. Temporal distribution of autobiographical 
memories and future directed thoughts in trauma-exposed samples should be addressed in 
future studies. The present study used few cue words, future studies should use more cue 
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words and possibly also different strategies to elicit autobiographical memories and future 
directed thoughts.  It would also be interesting to look at the relationship between temporal 
distribution and specificity in future studies. 
Future research should strive to develop novel methods to study specificity and 
temporal distribution of autobiographical memories and future directed thoughts. Research 
applying different methods is also necessary to establish whether the findings are robust. 
Cognitive control. As pointed out by Banich et al. (2009) future research should 
explore the relationship between memory processes and cognitive control.  Hence future 
studies on forgetting of emotional material after trauma, and studies on autobiographical 
memories and future directed thoughts should aim to more systematically investigate a 
possible contribution of cognitive control mechanisms.   
Implications 
The results from paper I showed that emotional material is more difficult forget, but 
that this tendency is not specific for trauma-exposed people, but rather a general tendency. 
This finding ad to an extensive amount of literature showing that emotional material is better 
remembered than more neutral material. Further knowledge about forgetting of emotional 
material might have practical implications for understanding reactions and symptoms in the 
aftermath of trauma. If emotional material is more resistant to mechanisms of forgetting this 
will have different implications for trauma-exposed individuals. 
The results from paper II showed that trauma-exposed individuals demonstrate more 
intrusions of trauma-specific material. This finding might be explained in terms of a source 
monitoring error in trauma-exposed individuals, however this remains an empirical question 
that should be addressed in future studies. Further knowledge about source monitoring in 
trauma-exposed people might be of great relevance for understanding how trauma is recalled, 
this in turn might be of significant relevance for legal professionals.  
Legal professionals can be informed by the present results. The present research 
suggests that trauma-exposed individuals not necessarily have deficits of memory. To the 
contrary, individuals exposed to sexual assault in the present study, are in fact as good at 
remembering trauma-specific information as their non-offended peers. However, higher levels 
of trauma symptoms are related to a limited ability to specifically recall events from their 
past. However, this is only related to autobiographical memory in general, and therefore not 
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necessarily indicating an impairment of their memory for the traumatic event. OGM has been 
associated with psychopathology, and clinical psychologists should be aware of the link 
between OGM, PTSD and depression. 
Conclusion 
The present findings suggest that trauma-exposed individuals have no deficits in 
remembering trauma-specific material, rather they tend to remember this material as well as 
non trauma-exposed individuals. Furthermore, the results indicate that normal mechanisms of 
forgetting are intact in trauma-exposed individuals. More specifically, no evidence for deficits 
in retrieval induced or intentional forgetting for trauma-exposed individuals was found.  
The findings from paper I suggest that emotional material is resistant to a mechanism 
of forgetting, irrespective of previous trauma exposure. The eradicated RIF effect for 
emotional material might have a more negative impact for people who have survived trauma, 
because the memories that repeatedly intrude into consciousness are experienced as very 
disturbing by the individual. The uncomfortable consequences of intrusive memories from a 
traumatic experience, might lead trauma victims attempt to intentionally forget these 
memories. However, the findings reported in paper II did not support neither a hypothesis 
about a general nor a trauma-specific deficit in intentional forgetting for trauma-exposed 
individuals as indicated by recall rates of F words for the two groups. However, trauma-
exposed individuals did show a higher level of intrusive recall of trauma-specific material. 
This tendency was related to higher symptoms of intrusion as measured by the IES. 
 Paper III confirmed previous findings reporting an association between higher levels 
of trauma symptoms and reduced specificity of autobiographical memories. However, 
contrary to our expectations this tendency was not found for future-directed thoughts. Hence 
the results from this study suggest that trauma symptoms only influence the specificity of 
mental time travel to the past, and not to the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
References 
Amir, N., Badour, C.L., & Freese, B. (2009). The effect of retrieval on recall of information 
in individuals with PTSD. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23, 535-540. 
doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2008.10.012       
Anderson, M.C. (2003). Rethinking the interference theory: executive control and the 
mechanisms of forgetting. Journal of Memory and Language, 49, 415-445. doi 
: 10.1016/j.jml.2003.08.006 
Anderson, M.C., Bjork R.A., & Bjork E.L. (1994). Remembering can cause forgetting: 
Retrieval dynamics in long-term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
3,1063-1087. doi :10.1037/0278-7393.20.5.1063 
Anderson, M. C., & Spellman, B. A. (1995). On the status of inhibitory mechanisms in 
cognition: Memory retrieval as a model case. Psychological Review, 102, 68-100. doi: 
10.1037/0033-295X.102.1.68  
Aslan, A., Baüml, K.-H., & Pastotter, B. (2007). No inhibitory deficit in older adults’ episodic 
memory. Psychological Science, 18, 72–78. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01851.x 
Banich, M.T., Mackiewicz, K.L., Depue., B.E., Whitmer, A.J. miller, G. A. & Heller, W. 
(2009). Cognitive control mechanisms, emotion and memory: A neural perspective 
with implications for psychopathology. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Review, 33, 
613-630. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.09.010 
Baüml, K. H. & Kuhbander, C. (2007). Remembering can cause forgetting, but not in 
negative moods. Psychological Science, 18, 111-115. doi : 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01857 
Beck, A. T., Epstein, N., Brown, G., & Steer, R. A. (1988) An inventory for measuring 
clinical anxiety: psychometric properties. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 56, 893-897. 
Beck, A.T., & Steer, R.A., (1990). Beck Anxiety Inventory-Manual. Psychological 
Corporation, San Antonio, TX. 
Beck, A.T., Steer, R.A.,& Brown, G. K. (1996). Manual for the Beck Depression Inventory-II. 
Psychological Corporation, San Antonio, TX. 
Bernstein, E. M., &  Putnam, F. W. (1986). Development, reliability, and validity of a 
dissociation scale. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 174, 727-735. 
48 
 
Berntsen, D., Rubin, D.C., & Bohni, M.K. (2008). Contrasting models of posttraumatic stress 
disorder: Reply to Monroe and Mineka (2008). Psychological Review, 115, 1099-
1107. 
Bjork, R. A. (1989). Retrieval inhibition as an adaptive mechanism in human memory. In H. 
L.Roediger III & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Varieties of memory and consciousness: 
Essays in honour of Endel Tulving (pp. 309-330). Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum. 
Brennen, T., Dybdahl, R. & Kapidžić, A. (2007). Trauma-related and neutral false memories 
in war-induced posttraumatic stress disorder. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 877-
885. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.06.012 
Brennen, T., Hasanovic, M., Zotovic, M., Blix, I., Skar, A.M.S., Prelic, N.K., Mehmedovic, 
I., Pajević I., Popović, N., & Gavrilov-Jerković, V. (2010). Trauma exposure in 
childhood impairs the ability to recall specific autobiographical memories in late 
adolescence. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 23, 240- 247. doi: 10.1002/jts.20513 
Breslau, N. (2009). The epidemiology of trauma, PTSD and other posttrauma disorders. 
Trauma Violence Abuse, 10, 198-210. doi: 10.1177/152483800933444 
Breuer, J. and Freud, S. (1893/1955) Studies on hysteria. In Strachey, J. (ed.). The standard 
edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud. London:Hoggath 
Press. 
Brewin, C. R. (2001). A cognitive neuroscience account of posttraumatic stress disorder and 
its treatment. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 373-393. doi:10.1016/S0005-
7967(00)00087-5 
Brewin, C.R. (2003). Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Malady or Myth? London:Yale  
University Press. 
Brewin, C.R. (2011). The nature and significance of memory disturbance in posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 7, 203-227. 
doi:10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032210-104544. 
Brewin, C.R., Dalgleish, T., & Joseph, S. (1996). A dual-representation theory of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Psychological Review, 106, 670-686. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.103.4.670  
Brewin, C. R., Hunter, E.  Carroll, F., & Tata, P (1996). Intrusive memories in depression: an 
index of schema activation?Psychological Medicine 26, 1271–1276. doi: 
10.1017/S0033291700035996 
49 
 
Brewin, C. R. , Kleiner, J. S., Vasterling, J. J., & Field, A.P. (2007). Memory for emotionally 
neutral information in posttraumatic stress disorder: A meta-analytic investigation. 
Journal of  Abnormal Psychology, 116, 448-63. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.116.3.448  
Camp, G.  Pecher,D.. & Schmidt, H.G. (2007). No retrieval-induced forgetting using item-
specific independent cues:evidence against a general inhibitory account. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 33, 950-958. 
Doi:10.1037/0278-7393.33.5.950 
Cardeña, E., & Weiner, L. (2004). Evaluation of dissociation across the lifespan. 
Psychotherapy, 41, 496–508. doi: 10.1037/0033-3204.41.4.496  
Carlson, B. E., & Putnam, F. W. (1993). An update on the dissociative experiences scale.            
Dissociation, 6, 16-27. 
Conway, M. A. & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical 
memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107, 261-288. doi: 
10.1037/0033-295X.107.2.261  
Cottencin, O., Vaiva, G., Huron, C., Devos, P., Decrocq, F., Jouvent, R., Goudemand, M., & 
Thomas, P. (2006). Directed forgetting in PTSD: A comparative study versus normal 
controls. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 40, 70-80. 
doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2005.04.001 
Daly, R.J. (1983). Samuel Pepys and post-traumatic stress disorder. The British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 143, 64-68. 
Dalgleish, T., Tchanturia, K., Serpell, L., Hems, S., Yiend, J., de Silva, P., & Treasure, J. 
(2003). Self-reported parental abuse relates to autobiographical memory style in 
patients with eating disorders. Emotion, 3, 211-222. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.3.3.211 
D’Argembeau, A., Raffard, S., & Van der Linden, M. (2008).  Remembering the past and 
imagining the future in schizophrenia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 117, 247-
251. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.117.1.247 
 de Decker, A ., Hermans, D., Raes, F., & Eelen, P. (2003). Autobiographical memory 
specificity and trauma in inpatient adolescents. Journal of Clinical Child and 
Adolescent Psychology, 32, 22-31. doi: 10.1207/S15374424JCCP3201_03  
Dehli, L. & Brennen, T. (2009). Does retrieval-induced forgetting occur for emotional 
stimuli? Cognition and Emotion, 23, 1056-1068. doi : 10.1080/02699930802285221 
50 
 
Dickson, J. M.,& Bates, G.W. (2006). Autobiographical memories and views of the future: In 
relation to dysphoria. International Journal of Psychology, 41, 107-116. 
doi:10.1080/00207590500188025 
Ehlers, A., & Clark, D. M. (2000). A cognitive model of posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 319-345. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00123-0 
Field, L.H. (1999). Post-traumatic stress disorder: A reappraisal. Journal of the Royal Society 
of Medicine, 92, 35-37. 
First, M. B., & Tasman, A. (Eds). (2004). DSM-IV-TR. Mental Disorders. Diagnosis, Etiology 
& Treatment. Chichester: Wiley. 
Foa, E. B., Cashman, L., Jaycox, L., & Perry, K. (1997). The validation of a self-report 
measure of posttraumatic stress disorder: The Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale. 
Psychological Assessment, 9, 445-451. doi: 10.1037/1040-3590.9.4.445  
Foa, E.B., Steketee, G. & Rothbaum, B. O. (1989).Behavioral/cognitive conceptualizations of 
post-traumatic stress disorder. Behavior Therapy, 20, 155–176.doi:10.1016/S0005-
7894(89)80067-X 
Golier, J. A., Yehuda, R., Lupien, S., & Harvey, P. D. (2003). Memory for trauma-related 
information in Holocaust survivors with PTSD. Psychiatry Research, 121, 133–
143.doi:10.1016/S0925-4927(03)00120-3  
Groome, D., & Sterkaj, F. (2010). Retrieval-induced forgetting and clinical depression. 
Cognition & Emotion, 24, 63-70. doi : 10.1080/02699930802536219 
Griffin, M. G., Uhlmansiek, M. H., Resick PA, & Mechanic, M.B. (2004). Comparison of the 
posttraumatic stress disorder scale versus the clinician-administered posttraumatic 
stress disorder scale in domestic violence survivors. Journal of Traumatic Stress,17, 
497-503.doi: 10.1007/s10960-004-5798-4 
Hassabis, D. Kumaran, D.,Vann, S.D., & Maguire, E.A. (2007). Patients with hippocampal 
amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 104, 1726-1731. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0610561104  
Harvey, A. G., Bryant, R. A., & Dang, S. T. (1998). Autobiographical memory in acute stress 
disorder. Journal of  Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 66, 500-506. doi: 
10.1037/0022-006X.66.3.500  
Henderson, D., Hargreaves, I., Gregory, S., & Williams, J. M. G. (2002). Autobiographical 
memory and emotion in a non-clinical sample of women with and without a reported 
51 
 
history of childhood sexual abuse. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 41, 129-
141.  doi: 10.1348/014466502163921 
Hermans, D., Van den Broek, K., Beblis, G., Raes, F., Pieters, G., & Eelen, P. (2004). Trauma 
and autobiographical memory specificity in depressed inpatients. Behavioural 
Research and Therapy, 42, 775-789. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(03)00197-9 
Hicks, J. L., & Starns, J. J. (2004). Retrieval-induced forgetting occurs in tests of item 
recognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 125-130. 
Horowitz, M. (1975). Intrusive and repetitive thoughts after stress. Archives of General 
Psychiatry. 32, 1457-1 463. 
Horowitz, M. (1976). Stress response syndromes. New York: Aronson. 
Horowitz, M., Wilner, N., & Alvarez, W. (1979). Impact of Event Scale: A measure of 
subjective stress. Psychosomatic Medicine, 41, 209-218. 
Johnson, H. (1994). Processes of successful intentional forgetting. Psychological Bulletin, 
116, 274-292. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.116.2.274 
Kardiner, A. (1941).The Traumatic Neuroses of War: By Abram Kardiner. Psychosomatic 
Medicine Monographs, 1, (2 and 3), Pp. 258.  
Kleim, B., Ehlers, A., Glucksman, E. (2007). Early predictors of chronic post-traumatic stress 
disorder in assault survivors. Psychological Medicine, 37, 357-360. 
doi:10.1017/S0033291707001006 
Krans, J. Näring, G. Becker, E.S., & Holmes, E., A. (2009). Intrusive trauma memory: A 
review and functional analysis. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23, 1076-1088. doi: 
10.1002/acp.1611 
Kuyken, W., & Brewin, C. R. (1995). Autobiographical memory functioning in depression 
and reports of early abuse. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104, 585-591. doi: 
10.1037/0021-843X.104.4.585  
Kvavilashvili, L., & Ellis, J. (2004). Ecological validity and twenty years of real-
life/laboratory controversy in memory research: A critical (and historical) review. 
History and Philosophy of Psychology, 6, 59-80. 
Merckelbach, H., Horselenberg, R., & Muris, P. (2001). The Creative Experiences 
Questionnaire (CEQ): a brief self-report measure of fantasy proneness. Personality 
and Individual Differences 31, 987–995. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00201-4 
52 
 
Merckelbach, H., Muris, P., & Rassin, E. (1999). Fantasy proneness and cognitive failures as 
correlates of dissociative experiences. Personality and Individual Differences, 26, 
961-967.doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00193-7 
McNally, R.J. (2003). Remembering Trauma. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard 
University Press. 
McNally, R. J., Lasko, N. B, Macklin, M. L., & Pitman, K. R. (1995). Autobiographical 
memory disturbance in combat-related posttraumatic stress disorder. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 33, 619-633.doi:10.1016/0005-7967(95)00007-K  
McNally, R.J., Metzger, L.J., Lasko, N.B., Clancy, S.A., & Pitman, R.K. (1998). Directed 
forgetting of trauma cues in adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse with and 
without posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, 596-601. 
McNally, R. J, Litz, B. T., Prassas, A., Shin, L., & Weathers, F. W. (1994). Emotional 
priming of autobiographical memory in post-traumatic stress disorder. Cognition and 
Emotion, 8, 351-367.doi: 10.1080/02699939408408946  
Miyake, A., Friedman, N.P., Emerson, M.J., Witzki, A.H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. 
(2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contribution to 
complex “ Frontal Lobe” taks: a latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 
49-100. doi:10.1006/cogp.1999.0734 
Moore, R. G., Watts, F. N., & Williams, J. M. G. (1988). The specificity of personal 
memories in depression. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 27, 275-276. 
Moore, S.A., & Zoellner, L.A. (2007). Overgeneral autobiographical memory and traumatic 
events: An evaluative review. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 419-437.  
doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.133.3.419 
Moulds, M.L. & Bryant, R.A. (2002). Directed forgetting in acute stress disorder. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 111, 175-179. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.111.1.175  
Moulds, M.L., & Bryant, R.A. (2005). An investigation of retrieval inhibition in acute stress 
disorder. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 18, 233-236. doi: 10.1002/jts.20022 
Moulds, M. L., & Kandris, E. (2006). The effect of practice on recall of negative material in 
dysphoria. Journal of Affective Disorders, 91, 269-272. doi:10.1016/j.jad.2006.01.003 
Myers, C. (1915). A contribution to the study of shell shock. Lancet, 316-320. 
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Shattered assumptions: Towards a new psychology of trauma. New 
York: Free Press. 
53 
 
Pedhazur, E. J., & Schmelkin, L. P. (1991). Measurement, design, and analysis: An integrated 
approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Perfect, T. J., Moulin, C. J. A., Conway, M. A., Perry, E. (2002). Assessing the inhibitory 
account of retrieval-induced forgetting with implicitmemory tests. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 28, 1111–1119. doi : 
10.1037//0278-7393.28.6.111 
Power, M.J., Dalgleish, T., Claudio, V., Tata, P., & Kentish, J. (2000). The directed forgetting 
task: application to emotionally valent material. Journal of Affective Disorders, 57, 
147-157. 
Potts, R., Law, R., Golding, J. F., & Groome, D. (2011). The reliability of retrieval-induced 
forgetting. European Psychologist. 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect 
effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & 
Computers, 36, 717-731.doi: 10.3758/BF03206553  
Puffet, A., Jehnin-Marchot, D., Timsit-Berthier, M., & Timsit, M. (1991). Autobiographical 
memory and major depressive states. European Psychiatry, 6, 141-146. 
Reynolds, M., & Brewin, C.R. (1999). Intrusive memories in depression and post-traumatic 
stress disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy , 37, 201–215. doi:10.1016/S0005-
7967(98)00132-6 
Rubin, D.C., Berntsen. D., & Bohni, M.K. (2008). A memory-based model of posttraumatic 
stress disorder: evaluating basic assumptions underlying the PTSD diagnosis. 
Psychological Review, 115, 985-1011. doi: 10.1037/a0013397 
Saunders, J., & MacLeod, M.D. (2006). Can inhibition resolve retrieval competition through 
the control of spreading activation? Memory & Cognition, 34, 307–322. 
Shobe, K.K., & Kihlstrom, J.F.  (1997).  Is traumatic memory special?   Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 7, 154-156. 
Schonfeld, S., Ehlers, A., Bollinghaus, I., & Rief, W. (2007). Overgeneral memory and 
suppression of trauma memories in post-traumatic stress disorder. Memory, 15, 339-
352. doi: 10.1080/09658210701256571  
Sahakyan, L., & Kelley, C. M. (2002). A contextual change account of the directed forgetting 
effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 28, 
1064–1072. 
54 
 
Shadish, W.R., Cook, T.D., & Campbell, D.T. (2002). Experimental and Quasi-Experimental 
Designs for generalized causal inference. Boston, NY: Houghton Mifflin. 
Shipherd, J.C. & Beck, J.G. (2005). The role of thought suppression in posttraumatic stress 
disorder. Behaviour Therapy, 36, 277-287.doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(05)80076-0  
Swales, M. A., Williams, J. M. G., & Wood, P. (2001). Specificity of autobiographical 
memory and mood disturbance in adolescents. Cognition and Emotion, 15, 321-331. 
doi: 10.1080/02699930125869 
Tabachnick, B.G., & Fidell, L.S.(2007). Experimental Designs using ANOVA. Belmont,CA: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing.Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian 
Psychology, 26, 1-12. 
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 
1-25. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135114 
Van der Kolk, B. A. (2007). The history of trauma in psychiatry.  In Handbook of PTSD. 
Science and Practice. (eds. Friedman, M. J., Keane, T. M., & Resick, P. A.). New 
York: Guildford Press. 
Van der Kolk, B. A. Weisaeth, L. Van der Hart,O. (2007). History of trauma in psychiatry. In 
Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body, and 
Society. (eds. van der Kolk, B.A.,  McFarland, A.C., & Weisaeth, L.). New York: 
Guilford Press.  
Veling, H., & van Knippenberg, A. (2004). Remembering can cause inhibition: Retrieval-
induced inhibition as cue independent process. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 315-318. doi : 10.1037/0278-7393.30.2.315 
Vrana. S. R.. Roodman. A,, & Beckham. J. C., 1995. Selective processing of trauma-relevant 
words in posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders. 9, 5 15-530. 
doi:10.1016/0887-6185(95)00028-M  
Wegner, D.M. (1989). White bears and other unwanted thoughts: Suppression, obsession, and 
the psychology of mental control. London: The Guilford Press 
Weiss, D. S., & Marmar, C. R. (1997). The Impact of Event Scale-Revised. In J.P. Wilson, & 
T.M. Keane (Eds.). Assessing Psychological Trauma and PTSD: A Practitioner’s 
Handbook (pp. 399-411). New York: Guilford Press. 
Wessel, I., Merckelbach, H., & Dekkers, T. (2002). Autobiographical memory specificity, 
intrusive memory, and general memory skills in Dutch-Indonesian survivors of the 
55 
 
World War II era. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 15, 227-234. 
doi: 10.1023/A:1015207428675 
Wessel, I., Meeren, M., Pieters, F., Arntz, A., & Merchelbach, H. (2001). Correlates of 
autobiographical memory specificity: The role of depression, anxiety and childhood 
trauma. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 409-421. doi:10.1016/S0005-
7967(00)00011-5 
Williams, J.M.G. (2006). Capture and rumination, functional avoidance and executive control 
(CaRFAX): Three processes that underlie overgeneral memory. Cognition and 
Emotion, 20, 548–568.doi: 10.1080/02699930500450465  
Williams, J. M.G. (1996). Depression and the specificity of autobiographical memory. In 
D.C.Rubin (Ed.), Remembering our past: Studies in autobiographical memory 
(pp.244-267). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Williams, J. M. G., & Broadbent, K. (1986). Autobiographical memory in suicide attempters. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95, 144-149. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.95.2.144 
Williams, J. M. G., Ellis, N.C., Tyers, C., Healy, H., Rose, G., & MacLeod, A. K. (1996). The 
specificity of autobiographical memory and imageability of the future. Memory and 
Cognition, 24, 116-125. doi: 10.3758/BF03197278  
Williams, W. H., Williams, J. M. G., & Ghadiali, E. J. (1998). Autobiographical memory in 
traumatic brain injury: Neuropsychological and mood predictors of recall. 
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 8, 43-60. doi: 10.1080/713755551 
Williams, J. M. G., & Scott, J. (1988). Autobiographical memory in depression. 
Psychological Medicine, 18, 689-695. doi: 10.1017/S0033291700008370 
Williams, J.M. G., Barnhofer, T., Crane, C. , Herman, D., Raes, F., Watkins, E., Dalgleish, T. 
(2007). Autobiographical memory specificity and emotional disorders. Psychological 
Bulletin, 113, 122-148. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.122  
Zoellner, L.A., Foa, E.B., & Przeworski, A. (2000). Are trauma victims susceptible to false 
memories? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 517-524.  
doi: 10.1037//0021-843X.109.3.517 
Zoellner, L.A, Sacks, M.B., & Foa, E.B. (2003). Directed forgetting following mood 
induction in chronic posttraumatic stress disorder patients. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 3, 508-514.doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.112.3.508  
 
56 
 
Papers I-III 
I

II

Intentional forgetting of emotional words after trauma: A study with victims of sexual assault 
 
Ines Blix and Tim Brennen 
Center for the Study of Human Cognition, Department of Psychology, University of Oslo 
 
 
Running head: INTENTIONAL FORGETTING AFTER TRAUMA 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: Ines Blix, Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, PO Box 
1094, 0317 Oslo, Norway 
 
Email: ines.blix@psykologi.uio.no 
Telephone: (+47) 22 84 5204 
Fax: (+47) 22 84 50 01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTENTIONAL FORGETTING AFTER TRAUMA 
 
2 
 
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful to Atle Dyregrov, the staff at Oslo Emergency Center, Bergen Emergency 
Center and DIXI for invaluable help with recruiting participants to the study. Thanks to Else-
Marie Augusti and Nils Inge Landrø for comments on a previous draft of this manuscript. Our 
biggest debt is to the participants who gave their time to the project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTENTIONAL FORGETTING AFTER TRAUMA 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
Following exposure to a trauma, people tend to experience intrusive thoughts and memories 
about the event. In order to investigate whether intrusive memories in the aftermath of trauma 
might be accounted for by an impaired ability to intentionally forget disturbing material, the 
present study used a modified Directed Forgetting (DF) task to examine intentional forgetting 
and intrusive recall of words in sexual assault victims and controls. By including words 
related to the trauma in addition to neutral, positive and threat-related stimuli it was possible 
to test for trauma-specific effects. No difference between the Trauma and the Control group 
was found for correct recall of to-be-forgotten (F) words or to-be-remembered (R) words. 
However, when recalling words from R- list, the Trauma group mistakenly recalled 
significantly more trauma-specific words from F- list. “Intrusive“ recall of F trauma words 
when asked to recall R-words was related to symptoms of intrusion reported on the IES.  
 
Keywords: Intentional forgetting, retrieval, forgetting, rape, directed forgetting, 
trauma, memory, sexual assault 
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Introduction 
After exposure to a trauma people often report intrusive thoughts and memories about 
the traumatic event (McNally, 2003), and these can be extremely persistent over many years. 
Intrusive memories or “recurrent recollections” refer to repetitive involuntary memories about 
the traumatic event. Intrusive memories are experienced as highly disturbing and have the 
paradoxical property that the more the person tries to suppress or avoid them the more 
persistent they become (Wegner, 1989). The present study investigated intrusive recall and 
capacity to intentionally forget in a nonclinical sample of trauma-exposed individuals, and a 
control group.  
A proportion of individuals exposed to trauma develop Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), in which intrusive memories and thoughts are core symptoms (DSM-IV). Several 
models of cognitive functioning in PTSD have been proposed (e.g. Brewin, 2001; Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000; Horowitz, 1975; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Rubin & Berntsen, 2008). These theories 
do not only inform us about cognition in clinical PTSD, but can also explain memory 
processes after trauma-exposure and development of persistent trauma symptoms in the 
aftermath of trauma. According to Brewin’s (2001) and Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) models, 
intrusive memories of the traumatic event arise because these memories are not integrated 
with the rest of autobiographical memory. Integration in autobiographical memory is 
prevented by maladaptive strategies like avoidance and suppression of disturbing thoughts.  
Rubin, Berntsen and Bohni (2008) proposed a memory-based model of PTSD where 
the development of PTSD symptoms following a trauma depends on the interaction between 
the event and the memory processes following the event. According to this model, no special 
memory mechanisms are needed to explain the development of trauma symptoms, or to 
explain intrusive memories in the aftermath of trauma. Rather what is known about emotion 
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and memory in general can explain the development of trauma-symptoms (Berntsen, Rubin & 
Bohni, 2008). 
 Indeed several studies have demonstrated that involuntary memories are not a trauma-
specific phenomenon; on the contrary, recurrent involuntary memories are common in 
everyday life. For the normal population the majority of these are positive (for an overview 
see Berntsen, 2009). However, in a diary study, students with PTSD symptoms recorded an 
equal number of positive and negative involuntary memories (Berntsen, 2001). Another diary 
study with PTSD participants showed that participants with a high level of PTSD symptoms 
recorded more negative involuntary and voluntary memories than participants with lower 
levels of PTSD symptoms (Rubin, Boals & Berntsen, 2008). Berntsen, Rubin and Bohni 
(2008) argued that emotional stress enhances both encoding of and access to a memory, thus 
both involuntary and voluntary memory recall will be enhanced for traumatic episodes. 
One task that has been used to study encoding and retrieval in the aftermath of trauma 
is Directed Forgetting (DF). In a DF task, participants are presented with lists of words, and 
an accompanying instruction either to remember or to forget the presented words. There are 
two main versions of the DF task: In the list method DF the Remember or Forget instructions 
are given after presentation of each list, whereas in the item method the Forget or Remember 
cue are given after each word. The standard Directed Forgetting effect refers to the fact that 
one remembers more words that one has been instructed to remember (R-words) compared to 
words one was instructed to forget (F-words) (Johnson, 1994). This Directed Forgetting effect 
is thought to reflect the ability to voluntarily forget material, and is often referred to as 
intentional forgetting. 
A few studies with trauma-exposed individuals have used the DF task to study recall 
and forgetting from a perspective hypothesising that trauma-exposed individuals are 
characterised by avoidant encoding, that is, a tendency to fail to encode upsetting material. 
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McNally, Metzger, Lasko, Clancy, and Pitman (1998) used an item method DF task to study 
intentional forgetting of trauma-related words relative to neutral and positive words in 
sexually abused participant with and without PTSD, and controls. However, in contrast to a 
hypothesis about avoidant encoding of trauma-related material in PTSD, the results showed 
no difference between the groups in recall of trauma-related R-words or F-words. On the 
contrary, but consistent with Rubin et al.’s model (2008), the participants remembered 
trauma-words very well, including the words they were instructed to forget. However, the 
PTSD patients demonstrated lower overall recall rates for positive and negative R-words. 
One possible explanation for the lack of support for avoidant encoding in PTSD, could 
be alternating states of dissociation (Zoellner, Sacks, & Foa, 2003). To examine this proposal 
Zoellner and colleagues induced dissociation prior to an item-cued DF task. Their main 
hypothesis was that state dissociation would eradicate the DF-effect for threat-related material 
in individuals with PTSD. The results revealed the opposite pattern. On the recall test, DF for 
threat-relevant stimuli was observed after serenity induction but not after dissociation 
induction. No differences between PTSD participants and controls were observed. On the 
recognition test, DF was observed after serenity induction for both groups. However after 
dissociation induction there was no DF for PTSD participants.  
Moulds and Bryant (2002; 2005) tested the avoidant encoding hypothesis using an 
item-specific DF procedure in trauma-exposed participants with acute stress disorder (ASD). 
They argued that it is more probable that avoidant encoding would be observed in the weeks 
after a trauma, rather than in persistent PTSD. The participants with ASD recalled fewer F 
trauma words compared to a group of trauma-exposed participants without ASD. However, 
the trauma-exposed participants without ASD showed no DF effect at all for trauma words, 
and this makes the results more difficult to interpret.  
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In summary, Moulds & Bryant’s (2002; 2005) studies are the only item-specific DF 
studies that support a hypothesis about avoidant encoding after trauma. Furthermore, the 
results from Zoellner et al. (2003) and McNally et al.’s (1998) studies shows that trauma-
exposed individuals remember trauma-related material very well.  
Cottencin and colleagues (2006) investigated DF in trauma-exposed individuals from a 
perspective arguing that intrusive memories, rather than avoidance and impaired voluntary 
recall, more correctly characterize cognition in PTSD. They hypothesised that due to a faulty 
inhibition mechanism, trauma-exposed participants with PTSD would have difficulties 
inhibiting F-words, compared to non trauma-exposed controls. In their study, a group of 
trauma-exposed participants with PTSD and a non trauma-exposed control group completed a 
version of the item-cued DF task comprising immediate conditional recall, where participants 
were asked to recall R-words, and final unconditional recall where participants were asked to 
recall both R-words and F-words. The results revealed that in the immediate conditional recall 
condition the PTSD group recalled fewer R-words compared to the controls. In contrast, the 
PTSD group recalled more F-words. In the final conditional recall where participants were 
asked to recall both F and R-words, a reduced DF effect for the PTSD group was found. The 
PTSD participants recalled fewer R-words, but there was no difference between groups with 
respect to recall of F-words.  
Intrusive memories are also characteristic for depression (e.g. Brewin, Hunter, Carroll 
& Tata, 1996), and intrusive memories in depression and PTSD have been found to share the 
same characteristics (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). Hence, DF studies with depressed 
individuals might be informative about intentional forgetting in PTSD. Power, Dalgleish, 
Claudio, Tata, and Kentish (2000) studied DF in clinically depressed, clinically anxious and 
healthy controls using a list method DF task, where half of the participants received a Forget 
cue after the first list and the other half did not. The results showed that the clinically 
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depressed participants in the Forget condition actually recalled more negative words than the 
clinically depressed participants in the Remember condition. This pattern was not found for 
positive words. Furthermore this pattern was not found for the clinically anxious participants 
or the controls. These results suggest a stronger rebound of depression-relevant material in 
clinical depression. Power et al. (2000) argued that this effect may also explain intrusive 
memories in PTSD, and suggested a common mechanism in depression and PTSD, involving 
a stronger rebound effect for aversive personal-relevant information.  
Wessel and Merckelbach (2006) investigated DF for emotional material in healthy 
participants. Using a list method DF task, these researchers showed a directed forgetting 
effect of equivalent size for neutral and negative word lists. This study indicates that for 
healthy participants there is no difference in intentional forgetting of either emotional or 
neutral material (Wessel & Merckelbach, 2006). 
In summary, the literature suggests that trauma-exposed individuals, especially those 
with a diagnosis of PTSD, suffer from intrusive memories about the traumatic event. 
Moreover, memory after trauma is better characterised by intrusive recollection rather than 
avoidant encoding and impaired recall of trauma-related memories. As discussed above, 
intrusive memories in the aftermath of trauma might result from an impaired ability to 
intentionally forget disturbing material. In line with this Cottencin et al. (2006) found support 
for deficits in intentional forgetting of neutral material in participants with PTSD. However, 
in Cottencin et al.’s (2006) study only neutral material was used, and so is silent as to whether 
different patterns would emerge for emotional and trauma-specific material. Furthermore, 
Power et al. (2000) reported data showing stronger rebound of depression-relevant material in 
clinical depression, and argued that the list method DF paradigm would be a good model for 
studying an enhanced rebound effect and intrusive memories also in PTSD.  
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In the present study we used a modified version of the list method DF task to study 
intentional forgetting and intrusive memories in a nonclinical group of trauma-exposed 
participants and controls. The purpose of the present study was twofold. The first aim was to 
investigate whether hypothesised deficits in intentional forgetting after trauma are specific to 
processing of trauma-specific material, or if they reflect a general tendency for all types of 
material. On the one hand, Cottencin et al.’s (2006) study with trauma-exposed participants 
with PTSD suggests a general tendency of impaired intentional forgetting in trauma-exposed 
individuals with PTSD. On the other hand, cognitive theories of PTSD (e.g. Brewin et al., 
1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) suggest that memory deficits in trauma exposed individuals are 
specific for processing of material associated with the traumatic episode. Furthermore, these 
theories predict impaired voluntary recall and enhanced involuntary recall for trauma-specific 
material in trauma-exposed individuals. Rubin et al.’s (2008) model is in agreement that 
involuntary recall should be enhanced, but also predicts enhanced voluntary recall of material 
associated with the trauma in trauma-exposed individuals. 
In order to investigate intrusive recall, a modified version of the list method DF was 
used. In the present study, all participants were first asked only to recall the second list: the R-
words. This way, any F-words that were recalled when asked to recall R-words could be 
considered intrusions. In line with Rubin et al.’s (2008) mnemonic model we hypothesised 
enhanced involuntary recall for trauma-specific material for the Trauma group. More 
specifically, we hypothesised that the Trauma group would mistakenly recall more trauma-
specific F-words when asked to recall R-words compared to controls. Furthermore, following 
Power et al. (2000) we hypothesised that the Trauma group would mistakenly recall more 
trauma-specific F-words compared to positive, neutral and threat-words, and compared to the 
controls. Thus the paradigm uses R and F instructions, but is not designed to pick up the 
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standard DF effect per se, although it does allow a comparison of correct recall of both F-
words and R-words between groups. 
In line with Rubin et al.’s (2008) model, we hypothesised that the trauma group would 
correctly recall more trauma-specific R-and F-words compared to controls, and compared to 
positive, neutral and threat-related words.  We also examined the relationship between trauma 
symptoms and depression symptoms and correct recall of R- and F-words. The second aim in 
the present study was to investigate intrusive involuntary recollection of trauma-specific 
material versus positive, threat-related and neutral material.  
Method 
Participants 
The Trauma group consisted of 23 women, all of whom had experienced sexual 
assault in adulthood. The Control group consisted of 23 non trauma-exposed women. 
Participant characteristics are presented in table 1. The participants in the trauma group were 
recruited from the Emergency Center in Bergen, the Emergency Center in Oslo, Dixi 
Resource Centre, Oslo and from the Center for Crisis Psychology in Bergen. The participants 
in the control group were recruited with posters placed on public transport, at the University, 
and in grocery shops. The project was approved by the Regional Committee for Medical 
Research Ethics for South-Eastern Norway.  
Design 
The present study used a mixed design with Group (trauma-exposed and non trauma-
exposed controls) as a between-subject factor. The within-subject factors were: Emotional 
Valence (Trauma-Specific, Threat-related, Neutral and Positive) and R/F (Remember, 
Forget). Recall accuracy was the dependent variable. 
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Materials 
Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS). The posttraumatic diagnostic scale (PDS) is a 
49 item self-report scale based on the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Studies have 
reported high internal consistency with an alpha coefficient of .92 and a test-retest correlation 
of .89 (Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997). 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II). The BDI-II is a self administered inventory 
that contains 21 items, it is used to measure current levels of depression (Beck, Steer & 
Brown, 1996). Beck and colleagues (1996) reported a test-retest correlation of .93 on a sample 
of 26 clinic patients.  
Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (BAI). The BAI (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1990) is a 21 item 
self-report inventory measuring severity of anxiety, which has high internal consistency with 
an alpha coefficient of .92 and a test-retest correlation of .75. 
 Impact of Event Scale- Revised (IES-R). The IES-R is a self-report instrument 
consisting of 22 items aimed to measure level of stress reactions commonly associated with 
PTSD: intrusion, avoidance and hyper-arousal. The internal consistency of the scale is 
reported to be high; one study reported the intrusion subscale to have an alpha coefficient of 
.91 and the avoidance subscale to have an alpha coefficient of .85 and hyper arousal .90. Test-
retest correlation of .57 for intrusion, avoidance .51, and hyper-arousal .59 has been reported 
(Weiss & Marmar, 1997). 
Directed Forgetting Task. In the present study two lists of words were presented to 
the participants. Each list consisted of 8 positive, 8 neutral, 8 threat-related, and 8 rape-related 
words. Across participants, the lists served an equal number of times as the Remember-list 
(R) and the Forget-list (F). To generate these words, 7 students were asked to come up with as 
many as possible words in the four categories. For the threat-related words the students were 
instructed to come up with words that are associated with traumatic experiences, but not 
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associated with rape (e.g. Traffic accident, Massacre, Fire). Three other students were asked 
to evaluate the words for emotional content on a scale from -3 to 3, additionally they were 
asked to indicate on a scale from 0-3 to what degree each word was associated with rape. The 
frequency of each word was estimated using the Oslo Corpus of Tagged Norwegian Texts 
database (http://www.tekstlab.uio.no/norsk/bokmaal/english.html). This database consists of 
18.3 million words from the most common magazines, newspapers, books and public reports 
in Norway. A one-way ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference in frequency 
between levels of valence, F(3,76) =.41,ns. A one-way ANOVA showed that there was a 
significant difference in word length between levels of valence, F(3,76) =.4.54, p < .01. 
Words in the neutral valence category had significantly shorter word length compared to 
positive words t(30) = 3.60, p < .001, compared to threat-related words t(30) = 2.93, p < .005, 
and compared to trauma-specific words t(30) = 3.46, p < .001. 
Procedure 
The participants were tested individually in a quiet lab by the first author. The 
experiment was run by an E-prime script, and consisted of four phases: 
1) To-be-forgotten list: 
The participants were shown an instruction on the screen: “You will now be shown a list 
of words. Try to remember these words”. Following this instruction the participants were 
presented 8 positive words, 8 threat-related words and 8 trauma-specific words and 8 
neutral words, in a random order. Each word was presented on a computer screen for 2000 
msec, this was followed by an interval of 500 msec with a blank screen, a fixation cross 
for 500 msec, and a blank screen for another 500 msec. After the first list of 32 words had 
been presented, the participants were instructed to try to forget the presented words: “Now 
try to forget the words you have seen. Try instead to remember the words you will be 
shown now.”  
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2) To-be-remembered list: 
The next list of 32 words was then presented on the computer screen, in a random order 
with the same interval as described above. 8 positive words, 8 threat-related words and 8 
trauma-specific words and 8 neutral words were presented. 
3)  Recall R-words: 
 Participants were then instructed to “Write down as many words as possible from the last 
list”, and were given 2 minutes in which to do so.  
4) Recall F-words: 
 Participants were asked to: “Write down as many words as possible from the first list”. 
This task also had a time frame of 2 minutes. 
Results 
While the groups did not differ in age or years of education, the Trauma group scored 
higher on the clinical measures (see Table 1).  
(Table 1) 
Correct recall of F and R-words. The mean number of correctly recalled words from 
the original list was calculated for each word type, and type of instruction (Forget, 
Remember) as presented in Table 2. 
(Table 2.) 
A mixed ANOVA with the between subjects factor of Group (Trauma, Control) x 
Instruction (Forget, Remember) x Valence (Positive, Neutral, Threat-related, Trauma-
Specific) was performed. There was a main effect of Instruction F(1, 43) = 72.97, p<.001, η2 
= .60. There was also a main effect of Valence F(3,129) = 6.24, p<.001, η2 = .14. This main 
effect reflected a pattern where significantly more neutral compared to positive words t(45) = 
3.51, p <.005 were recalled, significantly more trauma-specific compared to positive words 
t(45) = 4.44, p <.001, and significantly more negative compared to positive words were 
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recalled t(45) = 2.56, p <.05. No other comparisons turned out to be significant. No significant 
effect of Group on recall was found F(1, 43) =1.87, p=.18, and none of the interactions were 
significant. 
 An additional analysis was carried out after dividing the trauma group into a PTSD-
group (n=9) and a Trauma group (n=14) according to a recommended cut off score of 27 on 
the PDS (Griffin, Uhlmansiek, Resick, & Mechanic, 2004). The same pattern of results was 
observed for this analysis.  
 F-words mistakenly recalled when asked to recall R-words 
The mean number of words from the F- list mistakenly recalled when asked to recall 
R-words condition was calculated for each word type, these data are shown in Table 3.   
(Table 3.) 
A repeated-measures ANOVA with the between subjects factor of Group (Trauma, 
Control) and the within subject factor Valence (Positive, Neutral, Threat-related, Trauma-
Specific) was performed with the mistakenly recalled F-words. The main effect of Valence 
was not significant F(3,129) = .64, and there was no main effect of group, F(1,44) =.45. 
However, there was a significant interaction between Group and Valence, F(3, 132) = 4.36, 
p<.01, η2 = .09.  This interaction was broken down by independent samples t-tests for each 
valence, which showed that there was no significant difference between groups for Positive 
t(44) =.00, Threat-related t(44) =.75, and Neutral words t(44) =1.04. However, for Trauma-
specific words, the trauma group mistakenly reported more F-words when asked to recall R–
words compared to controls, t(44) = 3.14, p <.005. Moreover, separate t-tests comparing 
number of mistakenly recalled Forget-words were computed for each group separately, these 
analyses showed that the trauma group recalled significantly more Trauma-specific F-words 
during recall of R-words compared to Neutral F-words t(22)= 3.03, p<.01, to Positive F-
INTENTIONAL FORGETTING AFTER TRAUMA 
 
15 
 
words t(22)= 2.10, p<.05, and to Threat-related F-words t(22)= 2.20, p<.05.  For the control 
group there were no such significant differences. 
Additional analyses were carried out after dividing the trauma group into a PTSD-
group (n=9) and a Trauma group (n=14). The same pattern of results observed for the trauma 
group as a whole was also observed for both subgroups. 
 
Correlations 
Pearson’s correlations were performed to investigate possible relationship between 
mean numbers of correct recalled F- and R-words and scores on the IES, PDS, BDI and BAI 
(see table 4). To investigate a possible relationship between  the frequency of “intrusive“ 
recall of F trauma words in the R list and symptoms of intrusion reported on the IES, a 
Pearson’s correlation was computed, r=.38, p<.05. Similar analyses were carried out for 
positive, neutral and negative words, no significant correlations were found. 
(Table 4.) 
Discussion 
The two aims of the present study were to investigate the modulation of intentional 
forgetting by valence, and the intrusive recollection of neutral, positive, threat-related and 
trauma-specific material in trauma-exposed participants and non trauma-exposed controls. 
The results showed that for correct recall significantly more neutral, negative and trauma-
specific words were recalled compared to positive words. This pattern was found for both 
groups, and for both F- and R-words. Higher post-trauma symptom levels, as measured by the 
IES and the PDS, were associated with fewer correctly recalled R-words. This is in line with 
previous literature showing that PTSD and depression are associated with lower levels of 
correct recall of R-words (Cottencin et al., 2006; McNally et al, 1998). Also, significant 
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negative correlations between correct recall of R-words and scores on the BDI and the BAI 
were found.  
In line with our second hypothesis, the trauma-exposed participants mistakenly 
retrieved more trauma-specific F-words when asked to recall R-words, both relative to 
controls, and compared to the number of positive, neutral and threat-related F-words they 
mistakenly recalled. Moreover, a significant correlation between the frequency of “intrusive” 
recall of F trauma words and symptoms of intrusion reported on the IES was found. This can 
be interpreted in line with Power et al.’s (2000) suggestion about a stronger rebound effect for 
aversive personal-relevant information in depression and PTSD, and moreover the present 
findings suggest that this also happens in nonclinical groups of trauma-exposed individuals. 
The patterns of results in the present study is partly consistent with Ehlers and Clark’s 
(2000) and Brewin’s (2001) theories. While these theories predict that voluntary recall of the 
traumatic event are impaired and involuntary recollection is enhanced, the results in the 
present study shows a pattern where involuntary recall of trauma-specific material is 
enhanced, however it was no evidence for impaired voluntary recall of trauma-specific 
material. The present findings are also partly consistent with Rubin et al.’s (2008) mnemonic 
model of PTSD that holds that emotional stress enhances both involuntary and voluntary 
memory. Thus, similarly to the current findings, this model predicts enhanced involuntary 
recall of trauma-specific material for the trauma group. However, the model also predicts 
higher voluntary recall of trauma-specific material, which we did not find in the present study. 
The present study gives no support to either a hypothesis about a general or a trauma-
specific deficit in intentional forgetting for trauma-exposed individuals, as measured by 
voluntary recall of F-words on the DF task. The absence of group differences for correct 
recall of any word valence for both R- or F-words contrasts with previous findings (Cottencin 
et al., 2006), suggesting a general deficit in intentional forgetting in PTSD. Our results are 
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more in line with McNally et al.’s study (1998) where the results showed no difference 
between the groups in recall of trauma-related R-words or F- words. However, in McNally et 
al.’s (1998) study the PTSD patients demonstrated lower recall rates for positive and negative 
R-words, whereas this tendency was not found in the present study.  
 The conflicting results may be caused by differences in design. Former studies (e.g., 
Cottencin et al., 2006; McNally et al., 1998) have used an item-version of the DF task, 
whereas the present study employed a modified version of the list-version. In the modified 
version used in the present study all participants were first asked to recall the R-words, thus 
output order must be considered more carefully. It is not only the Remember cue that 
facilitates recall of R-words, but also the fact that the participants are asked to recall the R-
words before the F-words. Thus, order of recall might have been an influencing factor for 
correct recall of F- and R-words. Moreover, the time between the encoding and recall of R-
words was considerably shorter than the time between encoding and recall of F-words. This 
might have influenced differences in recall rates between F- and R-words. Additionally, in 
contrast to Cottencin et al.’s (2006) study sample, participants in the present study were not 
formally assessed for a diagnosis of PTSD.  Thus, differences in post-trauma symptoms might 
have contributed to the conflicting results. 
Differences in word length between levels of valence can be argued to have influenced 
the results in the present study. Words in the neutral valence category had significantly shorter 
word length compared to positive words, threat-related words , and trauma-specific words 
However, for correct recall a pattern was found where significantly more neutral, threat-
related and trauma-specific words compared to positive words were recalled. Thus, an 
explanation based on differences in word length alone does not fit the results in the present 
study. 
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How can we explain the increase in involuntary intrusive recollection of trauma-
specific words in the trauma group and the simultaneous lack of group differences in 
intentional forgetting or correct recall of R and F-words? The results do not suggest that the 
trauma-exposed participants have a general problem with intentional forgetting. Furthermore 
the recall test of the F-words suggest that they do not have a problem with intentional 
forgetting of trauma-specific material either. However, the trauma group did demonstrate a 
higher level of intrusive memories of trauma-specific F-words when asked to recall R-words. 
A source monitoring deficit for trauma-specific material for the trauma group is one possible 
explanation. Brennen, Dybdahl and Kapidžić (2007) used the DRM paradigm to study false 
memories in trauma-exposed participants with and without PTSD. In the DRM task 
participants are asked to  remember lists of words, some of the members of each list are 
associatively related to a target word that has not been presented, a so-called ‘‘critical lure’’. 
Participants typically falsely recall or recognise a high level of critical lures. This tendency to 
produce false memories has been explained in terms of a source monitoring error, more 
precisely the participants are not able to separate words that they thought about when they 
saw the words list from words that were actually presented in the list. In Brennen et al.’s 
(2007) study the results showed that participants with PTSD mistakenly recalled more 
trauma-specific critical lures in the DRM paradigm compared to trauma-exposed controls. For 
neutral lists however there was no difference between groups in false recall. Brennen et al.’s 
(2007) results can be understood as a trauma-specific source monitoring error in PTSD. The 
results of the present study can be interpreted in line with this, but suggests that such a deficit 
also can arise in trauma-exposed individuals without a diagnosis of PTSD. 
The present study has some limitations that need to be addressed. The sample in the 
present study was non-clinical, and perhaps different results would have emerged with a 
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clinical sample. Furthermore, no clinical evaluation was made and PTSD symptoms were 
determined by self-report on the IES and the PDS alone. 
It can be argued that different levels of integration of material have influenced the 
results. The trauma-specific material can be said to be more integrated than the positive, 
neutral and threat-related material, and a higher level of integration might influence source 
monitoring error. However, this explanation does not fit the pattern observed in the present 
study, because the control group did not show a tendency for higher level of mistakenly 
recalled trauma-specific F-words when asked to recall R-words. Another concern in the 
present study is the low number of correctly recalled words.  
In summary the present study found no differences between trauma-exposed 
participants and controls for correct recall of F-and R-words. However, the trauma group 
mistakenly recalled more trauma-specific F- words when asked to recall R-words. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Mean participant characteristics with associated t-values (standard deviation in 
brackets) 
 Trauma Control t (df) 
Age 25.26 (6.10) 24.08 (4.64) .73 (44) 
Years of post-school 
education 
4.71 (2.82) 4.96 (1.96) -.33 (44) 
Weeks since sexual 
assault 
52.61 (72.74) 
Range: 4-260  
- - 
Number previous trauma 1.17 (14) .35 (.49) 2.67 (44)* 
PDS 21.43 (11.23) .73 (1.51) 8.76 (44)**** 
IES 34.40 (18.63) 7.57 (13.05) 5.45 (41)**** 
BDI-II 18.70 (10.48) 5.59 (6.93) 5.09 (43)**** 
BAI 12.91 (8.60) 5.36 (6.93) 3.20 (42)*** 
 
*p<.05, ***p<.005, ****p<.0001 
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Table 2. Mean number of correctly recalled words (standard deviation in brackets) 
Word type Trauma Control 
 Forget Remember Forget Remember 
Positive .36 (.58) 1.26 (1.18) .87 (1.14) 1.78 (.95) 
Neutral 1.00 (1.00) 1.91 (1.12) 1.22 (1.41) 2.17 (1.19) 
Threat-related .91 (.95) 1.43 (1.27) .83 (1.92) 2.30 (1.18) 
Trauma-specific 1.13 (1.19) 2.34 (1.23) 1.17 (.98) 2.13 (1.49) 
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Table 3. Mean numbers of F-words recalled when instructed to recall R-words only (standard 
deviation in brackets) 
Word type Trauma Control 
Positive .43 (.66) .43 (.66) 
Neutral .32 (.57) .52 (.73) 
Threat-related .39(.58) .52(.59) 
Trauma-specific .87 (.76) .26 (.54) 
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Table 4. Pearson correlations between correct recall scores and clinical measures 
 BDI-II BAI PDS IES 
R-Words Trauma -.39 -.41 -.55** -.39 
Control -.37 -.27 -.24 -.18 
Total -.42** -.41** -.41** -.32* 
F-Words 
 
 
Trauma .05 -.08 -.10 .05 
Control -.44** -.36 -.37 -.07 
Total -.18 -.24 -.15 -.04 
 
*p<.05,  **p<.01  
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Appendix. Translations of the words presented in the R-list and the F-list. 
Positive  Neutral 
Festive Ball 
Successful Grapes 
Gift Grass 
Joy Hammer 
Inspired Sofa 
Praise Salt 
Funny Tractor 
Kind Audio 
  
Super Brush 
Nice Arm 
Friendship Milk 
Satisfied Shop 
Skilled Train 
Sympathetic Video 
Motivated Plant 
Comfortable Building 
  
Threat-related Trauma-Specific 
Hijacking Violent 
Floods Abuse 
Dismember Assault 
Fire Guilt 
Traffic Accident Threatening 
Disaster Attack 
Collision Intercourse 
Bombing Humble 
  
Plane crash Harrasment 
Mine Field Invade 
Assassination Maltreatment 
Storm Aversion 
Krig Dirty 
Murder Sex 
Casualty Shame 
Mugging Brutally 
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Abstract 
The present study investigated the relationship between trauma exposure and specificity and 
temporal distribution of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts. A group of 
sexual assault victims were compared with women without previous trauma exposure in 
relation to specificity of autobiographical memories, as measured by the Autobiographical 
Memory Task (AMT) and specificity of future-directed thoughts as measured by the Future 
Cueing Task (FCT). The temporal distribution of future-directed thoughts and 
autobiographical memories was studied by asking the participants to estimate when each 
memory reported on the AMT had occurred and when each future event reported on the FCT 
would occur. The results showed no difference between the trauma group and the controls on 
specificity of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts. In line with a review 
of Moore and Zoellner (2007), PTSD symptoms as measured by the Impact of Event Scale 
(IES) correlated negatively with specificity. Furthermore, we observed no difference in 
temporal distribution of future-directed thoughts or autobiographical memories between 
trauma-exposed participants and controls. 
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Introduction 
Experiencing traumatic events influences what and how we remember (McNally, 
2003). Studies with trauma-exposed individuals without a clinical diagnosis have shown that 
trauma exposure is associated with intrusive recall of trauma-related memories (for a review 
see Krans, Näring, Becker & Holmes, 2009),  higher level of false memories (Zoellner, Foa, 
& Przeworski, 2000), and overgeneral retrieval of autobiographical memories (OGM) (e.g. 
Brennen et al., 2010). Moreover, a proportion of people exposed to trauma develop 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a disorder that is characterised by intrusive memories 
and thoughts, flashback and fragmented memory for the traumatic event, and that has recently 
been called  as a disorder of memory (McNally, 2003). Thus, the impact of trauma on 
memory is well established, however less is known about the relationship between trauma and 
future-directed thoughts. The present study investigated the impact of trauma on 
autobiographical memory and future directed thinking in a nonclinical sample of trauma-
exposed individuals, and a control group.  
 Tulving (1985) suggested that the same episodic memory system underpins how we 
remember the past and imagine the future. Furthermore, he proposed that the ability to 
remember episodic memories from the past and to imagine specific events in the future is both 
forms of “mental time travel”. In other words, our episodic memory system provides us, in 
some limited sense, with the ability to travel both backwards and forwards in time, and 
thereby to relive episodes from our past as well as to imagine episodes that plausibly lie ahead 
in time. Studies using functional brain imaging have demonstrated a high correspondence of 
active areas in tasks tapping recollection of past experiences and construction of future 
experiences (e.g. Addis, Wong & Schachter, 2006; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007), 
thus supporting the notion that the forms of mental time travel draw on the same cognitive 
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system. In line with this, several studies have demonstrated that there is an intimate 
relationship between memory and future-directed thinking. For example, deficits in 
autobiographical memory have been reported to be associated with deficits in future-directed 
thinking in various populations e.g. in amnesics (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & Maguire, 
2007), schizophrenics (D’Argembeau, Raffard & Van der Linden, 2008), and depressed 
patients (Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose & MacLeod, 1996). Furthermore, valence and 
temporal distance have been found to influence phenomenological characteristics of 
autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts the same way (D’Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2004). Moreover, Spreng and Levine (2006) showed that the temporal distribution 
of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts fit the same power function. More 
specifically, the most frequent “destinations” of mental time travel were close to the present 
time, and decreased as a function of time from now, for both the forward and backward 
variants.  
The specificity of autobiographical memories 
In their pioneering study, Williams and Broadbent (1986) discovered that suicide 
attempters had difficulties retrieving specific autobiographical memories, instead tending to 
refer to more general categorical memories. That is, instead of retrieving memories from 
specific events, they tended to refer to more general categorical memories. For example, if 
asked to retrieve a memory for the word “happy”, trauma-exposed individuals would be more 
likely to retrieve a general memory such as “every time I did well at school”, as opposed to a 
specific memory, e.g. “The time I got an A on a maths test”. 
Subsequent research has demonstrated OGM in individuals exposed to a broad variety 
of traumatic events (e.g. Brennen et al., 2010; Dalgleish, Tchanturia, Serpell, Hems, Yiend, de 
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Silva & Treasure, 2003; de Decker, Hermans, Raes & Eelen, 2003; Henderson, Hargreaves, 
Gregory & Williams, 2002; Hermans, Van den Broeck, Belis, Raes, Pieter & Eelen, 2004; 
Kuyken & Brewin, 1995; Wessel, Merckelbach & Dekkers, 2002; Williams, Williams & 
Ghadiali, 1998).  
OGM has also been reported in PTSD (e.g. McNally, Lasko, Maclin & Pitman, 1995; 
McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin & Weather, 1994) and ASD (Harvey,Bryant, &Dang, 1998). 
However, since these traumatic stress reactions follow exposure to potentially traumatising 
events, it has been difficult to determine whether it is the exposure to potentially traumatising 
events per se or if it is the psychological reaction to the trauma that affects autobiographical 
memory retrieval, though a review by Moore and Zoellner (2007) concluded that trauma per 
se is not likely to lead to OGM.  
A few studies have investigated the relationship between OGM, trauma and symptoms 
of psychopathology prospectively, to try to establish whether OGM after trauma exposure 
constitutes a vulnerability factor for psychological disorders. For instance, in a study with 
survivors of a motor vehicle accident with and without ASD, Harvey, Bryant and Dang 
(1998) reported that difficulty retrieving specific autobiographical memories predicted PTSD 
severity at follow up six months later. In a study with fire fighters, Bryant, Sutherland and 
Guthrie (2007) showed that specificity prior to trauma predicted PTSD severity after trauma 
exposure. In contrast, Kangas, Henry and Bryant (2005) reported that OGM after receiving a 
cancer diagnosis did not predict subsequent PTSD severity. 
Furthermore, a few studies have reported an association between OGM and 
vulnerability to depression. A study with college students reported that OGM and stressful life 
events predicted subsequent depression (Gibbs & Rude, 2004). A prospective study with 
women who were about to undergo in vitro fertilization reported that the number of specific 
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autobiographical memories at baseline was negatively related to depressive and anxiety 
symptoms after treatment (Minnen, Wessel, Verhaak & Smeenk, 2005). These findings 
suggest that OGM can serve as a vulnerability factor for depression. Moreover, a study by 
Brittlebank, Scott, Williams and Ferrier (1993) found that OGM was associated with failure to 
recover from clinical depression. In line with this a metaanalysis investigating whether OGM 
is a predictor of the course of depression, concluded that reduced specificity was associated 
with higher levels of depressive symptoms at follow-up (Sumner, Griffith & Mineka, 2010). 
Williams (1996) proposed a model of the development of OGM, where he suggested 
that the mechanism underlying OGM is a truncated search in autobiographical memory. In his 
original model Williams proposed an affect regulation hypothesis where he explained that 
children growing up surrounded by a negative environment have a tendency to avoid retrieval 
of specific memories in order to avoid negative affect. This strategy of overgeneral retrieval 
may then become a stable trait that will continue to be used in adulthood, involving 
overgeneral retrieval of both positive and negative memories. Furthermore, this stable 
overgeneral retrieval style, while adaptive at first, was hypothesised to serve as a vulnerability 
factor towards the development of depression in adulthood. More recently, Williams (2006) 
suggested the CaRFAX model for OGM, where he proposed three mechanisms of OGM: 
Capture and rumination (CaR), functional avoidance (FA), and executive control dysfunction 
(X). Capture and rumination refers to how mnemonic information used to search for specific 
memories activates ruminative memories or thoughts and hence cause a truncated search. 
Executive resources plays an important role in retrieval of specific autobiographical 
memories, and a dysfunction in executive control or impairments in executive capacity can 
lead to a truncated search and thus underlie OGM. The mechanism of functional avoidance is 
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linked to Williams (1996) model, and refers to OGM as a strategy aimed at avoiding negative 
affect. 
The specificity of future-directed thoughts 
McNally et al. (1995, p.629) suggested that “an inability to remember the past may be 
related to an inability to imagine the future”, thus in conditions where reduced specificity is 
found it might also be expected that future-directed thoughts have reduced specificity. In line 
with this, Williams et al. (1996) reported that when an overgeneral retrieval style for 
autobiographical memories was induced either by instruction or by administration of low 
versus high imageable words, the specificity for future-directed thoughts was also reduced. 
Furthermore, Williams et al. (1996) reported that a group of depressed suicidal inpatients 
described both the past and imagined the future more generically than controls.  
Dickson & Bates (2006) found that dysphoric participants were less specific both in 
describing autobiographical memories, and when imagining the future. This tendency was 
also reported in a study investigating specificity of past and future thoughts in schizophrenia, 
here the specificity levels for past and future stories were significantly related in both the 
clinical group and the control group (D’Argembeau & Raffard, 2008). Holmes et al (2008) 
reported that high dysphoria compared to low dysphoria was associated with greater problems 
imagining vivid positive events. This tendency was not found for negative events. 
While several studies have demonstrated a robust relationship between trauma, OGM 
and some forms of psychopathology, no study has so far investigated the specificity of future-
directed thoughts after trauma. A relationship between trauma and specificity of future-
directed thought might be of importance because, as suggested by Williams et al. (2007), an 
impaired ability to imagine specific events in the future can be related to the ability to solve 
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problems in daily life. Sutherland and Bryant (2008) studied social problem solving and 
autobiographical memory specificity in trauma-exposed participants with and without PTSD. 
The results showed that the participants with PTSD had a higher level of OGM and also 
poorer problem solving abilities compared to the trauma-exposed controls. Furthermore, 
social problem solving was related to OGM, suggesting that impaired problem solving is 
associated with reduced specificity in PTSD. Thus, impaired specificity of future-directed 
thoughts after trauma might be an important factor for explaining vulnerability to post-trauma 
psychopathology. 
Future foreshortening 
Clinicians report that time perspective seems to be altered in trauma-exposed 
individuals (e.g. Terr, 1983). Furthermore, clinicians have noted that after experiencing a 
traumatic event the person’s focus lies more in the present and is less in the future (Martz, 
2010). Future foreshortening is listed in DSM-IV as a symptom in PTSD, and is defined as 
“an inability to make plans or to imagine having a career, family, marriage or normal lifespan 
after experiencing trauma” (APA, 2000). Despite this, only a few studies have focused on 
future-directed thinking after trauma. One study focusing on temporal orientation and long-
term psychological distress in trauma exposed individuals showed that less future orientation 
was associated with greater psychological distress in trauma-exposed participants (Holman 
and Silver, 1998). Martz and Livneh (2007) investigated whether so-called non-adaptive post-
trauma reactions to chronic illness and disability were associated with reduced ability to make 
long-term plans. No relationship between non-adaptive reactions to trauma and future time 
perspective was found. However, the results showed that adaptive psychosocial responses 
were associated with extended future time perspective. 
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McNally et al. (1995) studied the temporal distribution of retrieved memories in 
Vietnam veterans with and without PTSD. Memories retrieved on the AMT were coded 
according to whether the event had occurred the last month, the last year, and the last 5 years, 
the last 10 years or more than 10 years ago. The results showed that the retrieval curves for 
the controls and the PTSD participants were similar, with the exception that controls retrieved 
more memories from 10 years ago relative to PTSD participants. However, PTSD participants 
who still spontaneously wore war-regalia retrieved fewer memories from the last month, and 
more memories from 10 years ago, compared to non regalia-PTSD participants. The authors 
concluded that wearing regalia might represent a “psychological fixation” on the war and the 
altered temporal distribution of autobiographical memories can indicate that the individuals 
are in some sense “stuck in the past”.  
The present study 
If autobiographical memory and future-directed thinking depend on the same episodic 
memory system, it is reasonable to expect that trauma exposure is also associated with 
alterations in future-directed thinking. The present study is the first to focus on specificity and 
temporal distribution of future-directed thoughts and autobiographical memories after trauma. 
The aim of the present study was two-fold. The first aim was to investigate specificity 
of future-directed thoughts and autobiographical memories in trauma-exposed participants 
and controls. Moore and Zoellner’s (2007) review suggests that in adults it is symptoms of 
psychopathology in the aftermath of trauma, rather than trauma exposure per se that 
influences OGM. In line with this, we hypothesised that symptoms of traumatic stress would 
be associated with reduced specificity for autobiographical memories. We also hypothesised 
that symptoms of depression would be related with reduced specificity for autobiographical 
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memories and future directed thoughts. Furthermore, based on literature showing that the 
specificity of autobiographical memory and future-directed thoughts are related 
(D’Argembeau & Raffard, 2008; Williams et al., 1996) we hypothesised the relationship 
between symptoms of traumatic stress and specificity would be the same for future directed 
thoughts.  
The second aim was to see if one can detect future foreshortening in trauma-exposed 
participants by comparing the temporal distribution of their future-directed thoughts and 
autobiographical memory with those of controls. Based on the symptom of future 
foreshortening described in DSM-IV we hypothesised that, relative to controls, trauma-
exposed participants would imagine more future events in close temporal distance, and fewer 
events in more remote temporal distance.  
Method 
Participants 
The Trauma group consisted of 23 women, all of whom had experienced sexual 
assault in adulthood. The Control group consisted of 23 non trauma-exposed women. One 
participant from the trauma group was excluded from the analyses, due to a high proportion of 
no responses on both the AMT (80%) and the FCT (94%). There was also equipment failure 
for one participant in the control group. Participant characteristics of those included in the 
analyses are presented in Table 1. The participants in the trauma group were recruited from 
the Emergency Center in Bergen, the Emergency Center in Oslo, Dixi Resource Centre, and 
from the Center for Crisis Psychology in Bergen. The participants in the control group were 
recruited by posters at the University, on public transport and in grocery shops. The project 
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was approved by the Regional Committee for Medical Research Ethics, and another part of it 
is available in Blix and Brennen (in press).  
Instruments 
Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS). The PDS is a 49-item self-report scale based 
on the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Studies have reported high internal consistency 
with an alpha coefficient of .92 and a test-retest correlation of .89 (Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & 
Perry, 1997). 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II). The BDI-II is a self administered inventory 
that contains 21 items, it is used to measure current levels of depression (Beck, Steer & 
Brown, 1996). Beck and colleagues (1996) reported a test retest correlation of .93.  
             Impact of Event Scale- Revised (IES-R). The IES-R is a self-report instrument 
consisting of 22 items aimed to measure level of stress reactions commonly associated with 
PTSD; intrusion, avoidance and hyper-arousal. The internal consistency of the scale is 
reported to be high; one study reported the intrusion subscale to have an alpha coefficient of 
.91 and the avoidance subscale to have an alpha coefficient of .85 and hyper arousal .90. Test-
retest correlation of .57 for intrusion, avoidance .51, and hyperarousal .59 has been reported 
(Weiss & Marmar, 1997). The questions in the IES are anchored in a traumatic experience in 
the individual’s past. For the participants in the trauma-group, the event in the past would 
refer to the experience sexual-assault.  The participants in the control group were asked to 
refer to the “most distressing or traumatic event they had experienced when completing the 
questionnaire”. 
Autobiographical Memory Task. The AMT consists of cue words, where the 
valences of the cue words alternates between positive, like “optimistic”, negative, like “sad”, 
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and neutral words, like “garden”. In the present study every cue word was embedded in a 
sentence, e.g. “Try to imagine an episode form the past associated with the word garden”. The 
cue words will be presented to the participants alternating positive, negative and neutral.  
  In response to each cue word, the participants were asked to recall a specific memory 
of a particular event that occurred within the time span of one day. The instruction was shown 
on the computer screen and stated: “You will now see some sentences on the screen. The task 
is to describe a specific event that happened in the past to each sentence. A specific event is 
an episode that takes place within the time span of one day. The event that you describe can 
have happened either in close or distant past.”  The participants were first asked to practise 
on three cue words. A computer based version of the AMT was used and the answers were 
given in writing. Each word was present on the screen for as long as it took for the participant 
to write down the memory, however if no response was started after 60 seconds, a new cue 
sentence would appear on the screen. Following each response to the cue sentences they 
participants were asked to state when the described memory happened, they were asked to 
write down how many days, months or years it is since the episode happened.  
The Future Cuing Task (FCT). The future cuing task was first used by Williams and 
colleagues (1996) to measure the specificity of with which participants imagine their future. 
The participants were asked to imagine future events in response to positive, negative and 
neutral cue words. The instruction was shown on the computer screen and stated: “You will 
now see some sentences on the screen. The task is to describe a specific event in the future to 
each sentence. A specific event is an episode that takes place within the time span of one day. 
Try to imagine an event that is likely to happen, the event that you describe can happen either 
in close or distant future.” As in the AMT, the cue sentences were shown on the computer 
screen for as long as it took for the participant to write down a story, however if no response 
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was started within 60 seconds a new cue sentence were presented. After each story the 
participants were asked to state in how many days, months or years this event would be likely 
to happen. 
Cue words used in the AMT and the FCT. Two word lists, each composed by 5 
positive, 5 negative and 5 neutral cue words were used. The frequency of each word was 
estimated using the Oslo Corpus of Tagged Norwegian Texts database 
(http://www.tekstlab.uio.no/norsk/bokmaal/english.html). The wordlists were also rated for 
emotional content by three raters, who did not participate in the main task. The raters were 
asked to indicate the emotional valence for each word on a scale from -3 to 3.  List 1 and 2 
was matched so that it was no difference in either frequency or emotional valence. 
A one-way ANOVA with the independent variable of emotional valence showed that 
there were no significant difference in frequency of the words between levels of valence 
F(2,27) = .98, ns. Mean emotional content was calculated for each level of valence, positive 
words (M = 2.50, SD =.39), Negative (M = 2.06, SD = .38), Neutral words (M = .20, SD = 
.35).  
Procedure 
The participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory by the first author. The 
participants were first asked to complete the AMT, and then the FCT. Two lists of words were 
used in the AMT/FCT, half of the participants were given list 1 in the AMT and list 2 in the 
FCT, and the other half were presented to list 2 in the AMT and list 1 in the FCT. Order of the 
words within both lists was counterbalanced.   
Two independent raters evaluated both the responses on the AMT and the FCT in 
relation to specificity. The raters were instructed to categorise each response as either specific, 
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categorical, extended, semantic associate or as a non-response. A response was rated as 
categorical when it referred to a category of highly similar and often repeated events e.g. 
“Sad: Every time I quarrelled with my husband”. A response was categorised as extended 
memories refer to events that stretch out over a time span over one day; e.g. “Boring: When I 
was home from work with the flu”. A response was categorised as specific memories when it 
referred to one particular event/episode that occurred within the time span of 24 hours. “My 
birthday last year, I remember opening the present from a friend and ...”. A response was 
categorised as a semantic associate when it did not refer to an event but to knowledge about 
self or others. 
When calculating interrater agreement the categorisations were divided into specific, 
overgeneral and no response. For the AMT the mean Cohen’s kappa was .77. For the FCT the 
mean Cohen’s Kappa was .68. In cases where the two raters diverged, a third rater determined 
the categorisation. 
Results 
While the groups did not differ in age or years of education, the Trauma group scored 
higher on the clinical measures (see Table 1).  
(Table 1 about here) 
Specificity 
The proportion of specific responses on the AMT and the FCT was calculated for each 
level of valence, means and SD are shown in table 2. 
(Table 2. about here) 
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A mixed ANOVA was performed for specific responses with Task (Future vs. Past) 
and Valence (positive vs. negative vs. neutral) as within-subject factors, and Group (Trauma 
vs. Control) as between-subject factor. There was a significant main effect for Task, F(1,42) = 
25.39, p<.001, η2 =.27, reflecting a higher level of specific responses on the AMT compared 
to the FCT. No significant main effect of Valence F(1,42) =2.48, ns, or Group was found, 
F(1,42) =.01, ns. No significant interactions were found. 
An additional analysis was carried out after dividing the trauma group into a PTSD-
group (n=9) and a Trauma group (n=13) according to a recommended cut off score of 27 on 
the PDS (Griffin, Uhlmansiek, Resick, & Mechanic, 2004). The same pattern of results was 
observed for this analysis. 
Correlations 
Pearson’s correlations were performed to investigate possible relationship between 
proportion of specific responses on the FCT and the AMT and scores on the IES, PDS, and 
BDI . A significant correlation was found between IES and proportion of specific AMT 
responses r=-.41, p<01, when analysing separately for each level of valence a significant 
correlation was found between IES and specific responses to the negative cue words on the 
AMT r=-.39, p<.05, for neutral words the correlation was r=-.07, ns, for positive words the 
correlation was and r=.05, ns. Since only five participants in the control group completed the 
PDS,   the correlation between trauma symptoms as measured by the PDS and  specificity was 
calculated only for the trauma group, a significant correlation was found between the PDS and 
specificity level in the trauma group (r=-.44,p<.05) was found. No other correlations between 
autobiographical memory specificity and self-report measures were found. For FCT and self-
report measures no significant correlations were found, the correlation between IES and 
proportion of specific FCT responses was r=.06, p=.70. 
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In addition, to test the hypothesis that trauma symptoms as measured by the IES would 
mediate an effect between trauma-exposure and on specificity scores we used a bootstrap 
approach to mediation as suggested by Preacher & Hayes (2004). The analysis, using 20000 
bootstrap samples, showed that IES levels act as a mediator between trauma-exposure and 
autobiographical memory specificity (95% CI=0.0259, 0.1833, point estimate =0.12). Similar 
analysis preformed with future specificity showed no indication of mediation. Similarly, 
analyses investigating the hypothesis that BDI scores would mediate an effect between 
trauma-exposure and specificity showed no indication of mediation for either 
autobiographical memory specificity or future specificity.  
Relationship between future specificity and autobiographical memory specificity 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated to examine the relationship between 
future specificity and autobiographical memory specificity. Across all participants, there was 
no significant correlation between proportion specific responses on the AMT and proportion 
specific responses on the FCT, r=.13, ns. However, when we compared specificity in response 
to positive cue words on the FCT and the AMT a significant positive correlation was found 
r=.42, p<.01. For neutral cue words a significant negative correlation was found r=-.31, 
p<.05. For negative cue words no significant correlation was found, r=.03, p=.83. 
Temporal distribution of autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts 
Each response on the FCT and AMT was categorised into one of five time bins. The 
time bins used for the AMT and FCT responses were corresponding, on the FCT each 
response was coded according to whether the event were imagined to happen during the next 
week, the next month, the next six months, the next year, or in more than a year. On the AMT 
each response was coded according to whether the event had happened the last week, the last 
TRAUMA, MEMORY AND THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE 
18 
 
month, the last six months, the last year, or more than a year ago. Mean proportions and 
standard deviations for each time bin were calculated separately for each group (see table 3).  
For the FCT responses separate one-way ANOVAs with the independent variable of 
group showed that there were no difference between groups in proportion of responses for the 
time bins ‘the next week’, F(1,42) = 1.63, ns,  ‘the next six months’, F(1,42) = 2.12, ns,  ‘the 
next year’ F(1,42) = .89, ns or ‘more than a year’ F(1,42) = .76, ns. However, for the 
proportion of responses for ’the next month’ the difference between the groups approached 
significance F(2,27)=3.8, p=.06, with a higher proportion of memories for the controls.  For 
the AMT responses separate one-way ANOVAs with the independent variable of group 
showed that there was no difference between groups in proportion of responses for any of the 
time bins: ‘the last week’, F(1,42) = 1.19, ns, ‘last month’ F(1,42) = .01, ns,  ‘the last six 
months’, F(1,42) = .90, ns,  ‘the last year’ F(1,42) = .01, ns or ‘more than a year ago’ F(1,42) 
= .04, ns.   
 
(Table 3 about here) 
Discussion 
We predicted an association between trauma symptoms and reduced specificity for 
both autobiographical memories and future-directed thoughts. For autobiographical memories 
the correlational analyses showed that level of PTSD symptoms (as measured by the Impact 
of Event Scale) was negatively related to level of specificity for autobiographical memories. 
Furthermore, the mediation analyses showed that level of trauma symptoms as measured by 
IES act as a mediator between trauma exposure and autobiographical memory specificity. 
However, we observed no difference in specificity between the trauma and control group. 
This is in line with Moore and Zoellner’s (2007) review which concluded that OGM is 
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associated with symptoms of psychopathology and not with trauma exposure per se. 
However, in the present study we found no relationship between symptoms of depression and 
OGM. Furthermore there was no indication for a mediating role of depression.  
For future directed thoughts no relationship between trauma symptoms and specificity 
was found, and no indication of mediation was found. Hence, in contrast to our hypothesis, no 
relationship between specificity of future-directed thoughts and trauma symptoms was found. 
Thus, the relationship between trauma symptoms and specificity for autobiographical memory 
and future-directed thoughts was not the same. This finding is somewhat in contrast to 
McNally’s (1995) suggestion that OGM underlies problems with imagining the future in 
PTSD. However, it should be noted that the sample in the present study was small and the 
participants did not have a clinical diagnosis of PTSD.  
The present findings do not concur with previous studies that have demonstrated that 
reduced specificity of autobiographical memories are related to reduced specificity of future-
directed thoughts (D’Argembeau & Raffard, 2008; Dickson & Bates, 2006), and that 
specificity of past and future thoughts are influenced the same way by experimental 
manipulation (Williams et al., 1996). In the present study, a significant positive correlation 
was only found between specificity level for future-directed thoughts and autobiographical 
memories. However, for the memories and future-directed thoughts produced in response to 
neutral cue words a significant negative correlation was found, and for negative cue words no 
significant relationship was found. These findings do not concur with the results reported by 
Williams et al. (1996, Experiment 1), or with the findings of D’Argembeau et al. (2008) 
where a general relationship between memory and future specificity was found. 
The different findings might have been influenced by differences in procedure and 
administration of the AMT and the FCT. In the present study a computer-based version of the 
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AMT and FCT was administered, whereas in Williams et al. (1996) and D'Argembeau et al.’s 
(2008) study these tasks were administered as an interview. Furthermore, in D'Argembeau et 
al.’s (2008) study prompts were given when no specific response was given. As suggested by 
Yanes, Robert and Carlos (2008), OGM might be influenced by poor memory for task 
instructions. In the classical version of the AMT the participants are first instructed to recall 
specific memories to the cue words that follow. In the present study version the instruction 
was also given in the beginning, and in addition every cue was presented in a sentence that 
asked the participant to retrieve “a specific memory” or to “imagine a specific event”. This 
reminder of the task instruction before every cue word might have contributed to a higher 
specificity level in general. 
Also the different findings might also have been influenced by differences in cue 
words used across studies.  Differences in concreteness of the words for example might 
influence how easy or difficult it is to retrieve a specific memory. Level of concreteness might 
be even more important in the FCT  as imagining a specific episode in the future can be 
considered to be a more abstract and difficult task. The present results showed that the 
specificity level for autobiographical memory was higher compared to the specificity level for 
future-directed thoughts, for all levels of valence. This is in line with previous studies that 
have shown that the specificity level for autobiographical memory is higher than for future-
directed thoughts (Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009; Dickson & Bates, 2006; Williams et al., 
1996). 
The present study has some limitations that need to be addressed. First, the sample in 
the present study was non-clinical, and perhaps different results would have emerged with a 
clinical sample. Furthermore, no clinical evaluation was made and PTSD symptoms were 
measures by self-report inventories alone.  
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The present study used a cue word method to elicit past and future episodic thoughts, 
which has the advantage of experimental control. However, it might be suggested that 
spontaneously generated past and future thoughts might better represent mental time travel in 
everyday life and consequently be a more ecologically valid method to study the influence of 
trauma on this form of cognition.  
Future foreshortening 
Trauma exposure is associated with alterations in time perspective (Terr, 1984), and 
the DSM-IV lists “a sense of a foreshortened future” as a symptom of PTSD (APA, 2000). 
The present study investigated whether this might be reflected in different temporal pattern 
for future-directed episodic thoughts. We hypothesised that “future foreshortening” would be 
reflected in an increased focus on the close future and decreased focus on more remote future, 
and hence a pattern where trauma-exposed participants imagined more events in the near 
future. However, we did not find any support for altered temporal distribution for future-
directed thoughts in trauma-exposed individuals. 
Only 15 cue words were administered in the FCT and the AMT. A higher number cue 
words would allow for a more nuanced analysis of the temporal pattern. Hence, to draw more 
firm conclusions about trauma and temporal distribution of future-directed thoughts and 
autobiographical memories, future studies should use more cue words.  
In summary, the present study shows a relationship between trauma symptoms and 
reduced specificity of autobiographical memories, however no such relationship was found 
for future-directed thoughts. The concept of mental time travel (Tulving, 1985; 2002) refers to 
our ability to mentally travel back and forward in time and these abilities are suggested to 
depend on the same episodic memory system. Hence, it follows that trauma should have the 
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same influence on past and future thought. However, the present study provides some 
evidence that trauma symptoms only influence the specificity of mental time travel to the past, 
and not to the future. 
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Table 1. Mean participant characteristics with associated t-values (standard deviation in 
brackets) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       ** p<.01, ****p<.0001 
 
 
 
 
 Trauma Control t(df), p 
Age 25.59 (6.02) 24.18 (4.72) .86(42) 
Years of higher 
education 
4.93 (2.68) 4.88 (1.97) .06(42) 
Weeks since episode 54.45 (78.89)         - - 
Number previous trauma 1.22 (1.41) .36 (.49) 2.71 (42)** 
PDS 21.22 (11.45) .77(1.54) 8.30(42)**** 
IES 34.00 (18.98) 7.90 (13.30) 5.07(39)**** 
BDI-II 18.63 (10.71) 5.85 (6.17) 4.76(41)**** 
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Table 2. Mean proportion specific responses on the AMT and the FCT for each level of 
valence (standard deviation in brackets). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 AMT FCT 
 Trauma Controls Trauma Controls 
Positive .78 (.20) .76 (.22) .67 (.31) .67 (.26) 
Neutral .79 (.18)  .78 (.20) .57 (.26) .62 (.26) 
Negative .73 (.21) .80 (.19) .60 (.24) .49 (.27) 
Total .76 (.12) .78 (.17) .62 (.18) .59 (.19) 
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Table 3. Mean proportion FCT  and AMT responses for each time bin (standard deviations in 
brackets) 
FCT AMT 
 Trauma Control Trauma Control 
1 week .42 (.26) .33 (.18) .16 (.14) .21 (.15) 
1 month .17 (.13) .25 (.18) .11 (.10) .11 (.11) 
6 months .28 (.19) .21 (.15) .20 (.13) .16 (.12) 
1 year .06 (.09) .09 (.08) .11 (.11) .11 (.12) 
More than one year .08 (.09 .12 (.20) .42 (.21) .41 (.21) 
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Appendix. Translation of the words used in the AMT and FCT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST 1 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Optimistic Early Outraged 
Hug Conversation Rejection 
Care Park Unsuccessful 
Fun Boat Disappointment 
Successful Quick Pain 
 
LIST 2 
Funny Cabin Defeat 
Kind Train Afraid 
Party Mountains Hurt 
Love Different Angry 
Consideration Discussion Illness 

